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1THE ASSERTION OF ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY COUNSEL 
IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES – POLICY, PRIVILEGE AND THE 
SEARCH FOR TRUTH IN CASES INVOLVING IMPLIED WAIVERS 
Waiver of attorney-client privilege frequently arises as an issue in legal malpractice 
cases.  Discovery of privileged communications between client and counsel may show that 
attorneys other than the malpractice defendant played a substantial role in bringing about the 
client’s loss.  To obtain client/counsel communications relevant to the issue of malpractice 
causation, defense counsel often argue plaintiff’s conduct amounts to an “implied waiver,” that 
is, that some conduct of the privilege holder is legally equivalent to his or her conscious act to 
forego the protection the privilege affords.  In analyzing whether a waiver has occurred, courts 
frequently balance important policies, specifically, our legal system’s fundamental interest in 
finding out the “truth” about litigated events against its powerful interest in protecting counsel-
client communications, via privileges, thought by many courts and commentators to facilitate 
optimally effective client representation.1 The Supreme Court has addressed the policies 
underlying privileges and the legal system’s truth-finding function on a number of occasions.2
1 See infra Part IV. See especially Developments in the Law--Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L .Rev. 
1450, 1454 (1985)(hereinafter “Developments”) (privileges subordinate the goal of truth seeking to other societal 
interests, impeding the realization of a central objective of the legal system to advance other, often less immediate 
goals); Kenneth L. Rothenberg, Evidence: Attorney-Client Privilege & Work Product Doctrine, 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. 
825, 826 (1999)(“Although the attorney-client privilege may serve as a "roadblock to the truth" . . . society has 
subordinated the search for truth to a preferred value of full, confident, candid, confidential legal representation of a 
client.”); W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, 
Lying, and “Lying with an Explanation,” 44  S. Tx. L. Rev. 53 (2002).   
 
2 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996) (“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent 
upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the . . . [client's] interest in privacy and the 
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. . .” noting that  if the purpose of 
the privilege is to be served, participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict with some degree 
of certainty whether particular discussion will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be 
certain but results in widely varying application by the courts , is little better than no privilege at all. . . . ’” (citation 
omitted)); Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)(corporation privilege promotes free exchange of 
information which promotes broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice; sound 
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and depends on the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client);  U.S. v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,  709-713 (1974) (president’s privilege -- integrity of the judicial system and public confidence 
in same depend on full disclosure; privileges stand in derogation of the search for truth).   But see Jaffee 518 U.S. 1, 
2There has been an explosion of legal malpractice cases in recent times,3 for a variety of 
reasons,4 and recent empirical studies on how different interpretations of attorney client 
privilege are likely to affect communicative conduct,5 make review of this subject particularly 
timely.6 Because legal malpractice cases frequently involve several lawyers or firms providing 
serial representations, this article refers to such cases as “serial representation cases.”7
17-20 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (privilege impairs search for the truth, suggesting absence of 
privilege would not deter most people from being truthful for fear of disclosure in later litigation).   
3 See Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Transformation of the Ethical Boundaries of the Attorney-Client Privilete in 
Response to the Growing Complexity of the Modern Business World, 42 Willamette L. Rev. 79, 84-85 (Seton Hall 
L. Rev. 2004)(“[I]it has recently become increasingly common for an institutional client to sue its own lawyer if the 
client does not prevail in a lawsuit, resulting in a recent dramatic climb in legal malpractice litigation. . . there have 
been three major peaks in legal malpractice litigation. . . the number of published decisions on malpractice in the 
1970s was four times higher than in the 1960s. . . Moreover, in the 1970s, the number of reported decisions on legal 
malpractice equaled the number of all published malpractice decisions during the entire prior history of our country's 
jurisprudence. . .  In the 1980s, the number of published legal malpractice decisions was three times higher than in 
the previous decade. . .  This most recent peak in legal malpractice litigation continues into the new millennium, 
already demonstrating a 155% percent increase over the previous decade”) (notes omitted). 
 
4 Id. at 85 (noting that potential explanations include sociological factors, the general growth in the total 
number of attorneys, the increase of consumerism, greater expectations on the clients' part, and higher education 
among clients – “A statistical study of malpractice suits by area of law shows that attorneys with specialized 
practices and higher income levels are more likely to become a target of lawsuits by their own clients than are other 
attorneys. . . ”) (notes omitted). 
 
5 See, e.g., Herbert S. Wander, Association of Corporate Counsel  Survey: is the Attorney-Client Privilege  
Under Attack, SK084 ALI-ABA 191, 196-197 (May 15, 2005) (available on Westlaw)(assumptions underlying 
corporate attorney client privilege supported by empirical data -- absent privilege, corporate clients would be less 
candid with their attorneys -- there would be a “chill” in the flow of candor of information from clients to counsel); 
Stephanie A. Martz, Member Survey: Attorney-Client Privilege is Under Attack, 29-JUL Champion 6 (July 1995) 
(available on Westlaw) (more communication/candor where no waiver).  Cf. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking 
Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 358 (1989)(assumptions underlying attorney client privilege not supported by 
empirical studies); Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 
St. John’s L. Rev. 191 (1989) (empirical studies do not strongly support privilege, in corporate context); Comment, 
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged 
Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962) (arguments for strict privileges not supported by data).   
 
6 Empirical studies are discussed infra in Part V(B). 
 
7 Lewinbuk, supra note 3 at 85 (“application of this [implied waiver] rule. . . is questionable in instances in 
which a group of attorneys represented a client in the underlying litigation, but only one of them is accused of 
malpractice. . . The challenge. . . arises when the accused attorney claims that the client has also waived the 
attorney-client privilege between herself and other lawyers involved in the underlying matter and, as a result, the 
accused attorney is entitled to the production of documents reflecting those inter-lawyer communications. . . Similar 
situations have emerged in lawsuits all over the country. . .”)  (notes omitted). 
 
3Section I explores justifications that have been proffered for the attorney client privilege, 
the most common formulations of its elements, and the various theories of waiver courts have 
applied in serial representation and other cases.  Section I discusses Hearn v. Rhay,8 which sets 
forth the leading test on implied waiver (the “Hearn Test’), and  two cases on which courts have 
focused,  Jakobleff v. Cerrato, Sweeney and Cohn (“Jakobleff”),9 in which the court refused to 
find an “implied waiver,”  and Pappas v. Holloway (Pappas),10 in which “implied waiver” was 
found.  Section II discusses serial representation cases following Jakobleff, many distinguishing 
Pappas, and Section III, serial representation cases following Pappas, largely distinguishing 
Jakobleff. These sections identify questions on which courts tend to focus and rules and 
principles courts recurrently apply in their analyses of implied waiver arguments. 
Section IV discusses academic and case criticism of the Hearn Test, specifically, that its 
reliance on the concept of “fairness” leads to ad hoc results, case confusion, uncertainty, and the 
likelihood of manipulation of privileges.  The authors conclude that, in practice,  the language of 
“fairness” is largely a short-hand; what courts are actually doing is simply inquiring into the 
causation of malpractice damages.  Although critics have argued outcomes of privilege motions 
are “ad hoc,” outcomes are, by and large, well-reasoned efforts to assure that defendants will be 
able to adduce evidence showing another attorney caused or exacerbated malpractice injury.     
Section V addresses Hearn critic arguments that our legal system would be better without 
an implied waiver doctrine and empirical studies that have tried to determine the extent to which 
different interpretations of the attorney client privilege foster more (and more candid) 
client/counsel communication. This section distinguishes “better representation” within a legal 
 
8 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D.Wash. 1975). 
9 97 A.D.2d 834, 468 N.Y.S.2d 895 (2d Dep’t 1983). 
 
4system from a “better legal system,” arguing the former cannot be defined without reference to 
ends of the system itself, including the search for truth, and that the latter should not be defined 
merely in terms of conditions that optimize client chances of obtaining litigation ends, as 
apologists for elimination of privilege sometimes appear to assume.  
A “better legal system,”  this section suggests, is one whose structures, rules and 
procedures tend to consistently generate “just” outcomes; outcomes are “just” when courts apply 
rules which enable the fact-finder to accurately determine the truth about material events, when 
the rules by which such assessments are made are themselves fair (and do not unreasonably 
compromise other values our legal system recognizes as valid), and where such rules are 
reasonably “resilient” against efforts by zealous advocates to abuse them.   This article concludes 
that the Hearn Test satisfies the above conditions, that implied waiver critics have not made a 
cogent case for rejecting the majority test and that injustices in individual cases that all sides 
agree would inevitably attend elimination of implied waiver from privilege adjudication, justifies 
continued application of the Hearn Test.  
I. Privilege, Policy, Implicit Waiver and the Leading Cases  
A. Privilege and Policy 
Commentators Mallen and Smith, in their leading treatise “Legal Malpractice,” state the 
rationale supporting the attorney client privilege as follows: 
The basic purpose of the privilege is to protect clients from the exposure of 
communications made to their attorneys, which were intended to be confidential.  
The policy is meant to encourage full and candid disclosure of all pertinent 
information to the attorney. Confidentiality must be maintained to enable clients 
to fully trust their attorneys with their most private secrets.  Often, frank and 
candid disclosure by the client is essential for effective representation, such as in 
 
10 114 Wash.2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990). 
5criminal defenses.  Full disclosure is encouraged though others may be injured 
because they are thereby precluded from learning pertinent facts.11 
Federal courts, generally, have relied on either Professor Wigmore's or Judge Wyzanski's 
interpretation of the attorney-client privilege.  Under Professor Wigmore’s interpretation:   
(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought; 
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such;  
(3) the communications relating to that purpose;  
(4) made in confidence; 
(5) by the client;  
(6) are at his instance permanently protected; 
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,  
(8) except the protection may be waived.12 
Under Judge Wyzanski’s interpretation,  the privilege applies only if: 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;  
 
11 RONALD E. MALLEN and JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (hereinafter “LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE”), Vol. 5, Section 33.29 at 179 (5th Ed. 2000).  The theory underlying the attorney client privilege 
is that if full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients is encouraged, a broader public interest in 
the observance of law and administration of justice will result. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 et seq. 
(McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp.2002).  Originally, the attorney client privilege was meant to protect attorneys, not 
clients.   See Patricia E. Salkin and Allyson Phillips, Eliminating Political Maneuvering: A Light at the End of the 
Tunnel for the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 561, 562 (2006)(“the attorney-client privilege. 
. . was created for the purpose of protecting the oath and honor of the attorney. . . As a result, in its earliest form, the 
privilege could only be waived by the attorney. . . Over time, the policy reasons for the privilege have changed. . . .") 
(notes omitted).  Salkin and Phillips observe that, in the government setting, if government officials believe their 
communications may be disclosed, they will avoid discussing sensitive matters, potentially leading to legal 
violations and increased incidences of corruption, or people being unwilling to serve in public office. Id. at 565 
 
12 See Arcuri v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 154 F.R.D. 97, 101 (D.N.J. 1994)(quoting 8 Wigmore on 
Evidence § 2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Professor Wigmore’s views on privilege have been severely 
criticized. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean 
Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 145, 148-149 (2004)(Wigmore’s insistence that 
the party opposing the privilege not be permitted to defeat the privilege by an ad hoc, case-specific showing of need 
for the privileged information based on the assumption that absolute confidentiality is necessary to encourage clients 
to consult with attorneys, arguing assumption is contradicted by empirical studies. Id. at 157-160 (discussing 
studies)).   
6(2) the person to whom the communication was made  
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and  
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;  
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed: 
(a) by his client  
(b) without the presence of strangers  
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either  
(i) an opinion on law or  
(ii) legal services or  
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and  
(d) not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and  
(4) the privilege has been  
(a) claimed and  
(b) not waived by the client.13 
B. Implied Waiver – Competing Tests, including the Majority “Hearn” Test 
Cases involving waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be broken into two broad 
categories, cases involving claims of an actual, or express, waiver, and cases involving conduct 
arguably constituting an implied subject matter waiver.14 “Actual waiver” occurs when 
 
13 Arcuri, 154 F.R.D. at 101-102 (quoting Judge Wyzanski, observing that this statement of privilege is the 
“most frequently cited articulation” of the privilege, citing U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 
358-59 (D.Mass.1950) and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.1979)). 
 
14 See generally T. Maxfield Bahner and Michael L. Gallion,  Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Via Issue 
Injection: a Call For Uniformity, 65 Def. Couns. J. 199, 200-201 (April, 1998) (“Two general categories of waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege have developed: (1) actual (express) waiver, and (2) implied subject matter waiver.”); 
Rothenberg, supra note 1 at 827 (citing Bahner and Gallion).  See generally U.S. v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th 
Cir. 1986)(filing suit against lawyer not a waiver of privilege for all subsequent proceedings),  cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1109 (1986); Zenith Radio Corp. v. U.S., 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1985) (same). The institution of suit against 
an attorney does not waive the privilege even as to matters that are raised in both the malpractice suit and the third 
7confidential communications are disclosed to a third party outside the attorney-client 
relationship.15 “Implied subject matter waiver” occurs when confidential communications are 
disclosed or injected as part of a claim or defense in litigation.16 Implied subject matter waiver 
may be further broken into subcategories of (1) issue injection and (2) selective disclosure.17 
Issue injection occurs when a litigant puts the substance of a confidential communication “in 
issue” (or “at issue”) in a particular litigation,18 and selective disclosure occurs when a litigant 
discloses a portion of the confidential communication, invoking privilege to shield the rest of it.19 
Three main tests have emerged for issue injection waiver: (1) the automatic waiver rule, 
(2) the balancing test, and (3) the “Hearn Test,” which derives from Hearn v. Rhay.20 
Under the automatic waiver rule, a litigant injects an issue into a litigation, automatically 
waiving the attorney client privilege, by asserting a claim, counterclaim or affirmative defense 
 
party suit. Ballard, 779 F.2d at 291-92. The revelation of confidential communications, not institution of suit, 
determines whether a party waives the attorney-client privilege. Thus, if a complaint against an attorney, or the 
attorney's response or testimony in the malpractice case, reveals confidential client communications, the client 
waives the privilege as to the subject matter of the disclosed communications. See, e.g., Laughner v. U.S., 373 F.2d 
326, 327 (5th Cir.1967) (privilege waived where client "demanded and obtained" factual inquiry into claim that 
attorney failed to render effective assistance).  
 
15 Bahner and Gallion, supra note 14 at 200-2001.  
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D.Wash. 1975). See infra Part II, discussing Hearn. See generally Steven Plitt, The 
Elastic Contours of Attorney-Client Privilege and Waiver in the Context of Insurance Company Bad Faith: There’s 
a Chill in the Air, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 513, 534-541 (2004). 
 
8that raises as an issue a matter to which otherwise privileged material is relevant.21 Many courts 
have rejected this approach because of its rigidity and harshness in application.22 
Under the second approach, the balancing test, disclosure of confidential information is 
required if a communication or some part of it is “vital” or “necessary” to defendant’s case, but 
only after defendant has shown he has exhausted every reasonable source of information.23 
Approaches to privilege which rely on the necessity of information have been criticized as being 
inconsistent with concepts of absolute privilege and the idea of reasonable limitation of waiver.24 
A third approach, referred to as the “anticipatory waiver approach,” has gained limited 
approval.25 It provides that privilege is waived when party claims or defenses compel them 
"inevitably to draw upon a privileged communication at trial in order to prevail."26 The Hearn 
Test, described below, is the majority approach.27 The federal circuits are split on which 
approach is appropriate.28 
21 See Indep. Prod. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y.1958).  
 
22 See, e.g., Frontier Refining Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 701-702 (10th Cir. 1998); Remington 
Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 414 (D.Del.1992); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 
168, 171(D.Colo.1991);.Greater Newbury Port Clam Shell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 
1988); Afro-Lecan, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United 
States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“privileges involve subtle and sensitive questions and ordinarily should 
not be breached without a more penetrating analysis than the automatic waiver rule involves.”).  
 
23 See, e.g.,  Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1266-68 (C.A.D.C.1981), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 3505, 73 L.Ed.2d 1381 (1982) (balancing need for 
discovery against importance of privilege).  
 
24 See generally Casey Nix, In re Sealed Case: The Attorney-Client Privilege – Till Death Do us Part?, 43 
Vill. L. Rev. 285, 318 (1998)( balancing test undermines element of certainty necessary for the effectiveness of the 
privilege, chilling attorney-client communications).  See also infra Part IV (discussing case and commentator 
criticism of Hearn Test reliance on need for information).   
 
25 Rothenberg, supra note 1, at 828.   
 
26 Smith v. Cavanaugh Pierson Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1145 (La. 1987)). 
 
27 See infra notes 29-33.  A number of cases and commentators have read the Hearn Test, itself, as a form of 
balancing test. See, e.g., Howe v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 440 Mich. 203, 487 N.W.2d 374 (1992); Jane C. Moore, 
Note, Evidence-at-Issue Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Public Service Co of New Mexico v. Lyons: A  
Party Must Use Privileged Materials Offensively in Order to Waive the Privilege, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 623, 635 (2001); 
9C. Hearn v. Rhay 
In Hearn,29 the United States District Court for Eastern Washington developed a test to 
determine whether the facts in a given case support an implied waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege. Plaintiff, an inmate at the Washington State Penitentiary, sued prison officials in their 
official capacity for alleged civil rights violations. Defendants raised the affirmative defense of 
qualified immunity from suit on the grounds they acted in good faith and on advice of their legal 
counsel. When plaintiff sought disclosure of communications between defendants and their 
attorneys, defendants refused to comply, arguing the communications were protected under the 
attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff responded that the attorney-client privilege did not cover the 
communications, or, alternatively, that defendants waived the privilege when their counsel 
asserted a good faith affirmative defense.  
The trial court held defendants were required to disclose the communications.  
It held that where the following three conditions are satisfied, an implied waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege should be found: (1) assertion of the privilege was the result of some 
affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party;30 (2) through this affirmative act, the 
asserting party put the protected information “at issue” by making it relevant to the case;31 and 
(3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital 
 
Anthony J. Golowski II and Anthony M. Rainone, Implied Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Another 
Consequence of Bad Faith Claims, 4 No. 11 Ins. Coverage L. Bull. 3 (Dec. 2005)(available on Westlaw).   
 
28 See Rothenberg, supra note 1 at 832 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit follows a balancing test, weighing the need for 
the privileged information versus the need for protection of the confidential information to analyze implied waiver… 
Both the Eighth and First Circuits apply some type of balancing test as well… A majority of federal circuits, 
including the Second… Fifth… Seventh… Ninth. . .  and Eleventh. . . favor the Hearn test. The Third Circuit 
follows the anticipatory waiver test. . . ”) (notes omitted). 
 
29 Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D.574 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
 
30 Id. at 581. 
 
31 Id. 
10
to his defense.32 Thus, where these three conditions exist, a court should find that the person 
asserting a privilege has impliedly waived it through his or her own affirmative conduct.33 
D. Jakobleff v. Cerrato, Sweeney and Cohn 
In Jakobleff, plaintiff sued former attorneys for damages resulting from their alleged 
negligence in securing a divorce settlement.  The attorney defendants impleaded the attorney 
plaintiff retained to prosecute the legal malpractice claim alleging the malpractice lawyer failed 
to mitigate plaintiff’s damages by not pursuing possible remedial actions against plaintiff's ex-
husband. The waiver issue arose when the defendant divorce lawyers sought to depose the 
subsequently retained malpractice plaintiff attorney. The court first observed that a waiver could 
be found in two situations: (1) where a client places the subject matter of the privileged 
communication “in issue” or (2) “where invasion of the privilege is required to determine the 
validity of the client’s claim or defense and application of the privilege would deprive the 
adversary of vital information.”34 
The trial court held the communications at issue were protected by the privilege, a 
holding affirmed on appeal:  
By bringing an action against her former attorneys for legal malpractice, plaintiff 
has placed her damages in issue, and defendants may both raise the defense of 
plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages and assert a third-party claim for 
contribution against the present attorney for those damages for which the former 
attorneys may be liable to plaintiff. However, it simply cannot be said that 
plaintiff has placed her privileged communications with her present attorney in 
issue, or that discovery of such communications is required to enable defendants 
to assert a defense or to prosecute their third-party claim. To conclude otherwise 
would render the privilege illusory in all legal malpractice actions: the former 
attorney could, merely by virtue of asserting a third-party claim for contribution 
 
32 Id.
33 Id. 
34 97 A.D.2d at 835, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 895. 
11
against the present attorney, effectively invade the privilege in every case.35 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Although the divorce lawyers’ interposition of mitigation and contribution defenses 
placed plaintiff’s malpractice damages “at issue,” assertion of these defenses did not place the 
privileged communications themselves “at issue,” because they did not implicate the malpractice 
itself, but, rather, only its consequences.  In other words, damages may have been mitigated or 
exacerbated by the later-retained attorneys’ conduct or inaction, but the later-retained attorney’s 
conduct could not have been part of the alleged malpractice in the divorce proceeding.  Finding a 
waiver in such circumstances would, the Jakobleff Court concluded, render the privilege 
“illusory” in all legal malpractice actions.  Malpractice defendants could, in many cases, assert a 
contribution or mitigation claim, or other affirmative defense, so that the privilege issue would 
turn on defendant’s “artful pleading.”36 
Jakobleff contributes three critical distinctions to legal malpractice analysis; first, the 
distinction between placing plaintiff’s damages in issue and placing plaintiff’s communications 
with counsel in issue, second, the distinction between the act of malpractice and the 
consequences of malpractice, and third, the distinction between plaintiff’s theory of causation of 
injury and the malpractice defendant’s pleading of defenses. The Jakobleff Court, however, was 
 
35 Id. 
36 See generally Chase Manhattan Bank v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y.1984)(party 
could not justify breaching privilege by reason of its own pleading of an affirmative defense since doing so would 
give a skilled-pleader adversary ability to render privilege a nullity); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Massachusetts Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 183, 192-193 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)(same, relying on Chase and, also Tribune Co. v. 
Purcigliotti, 1997 WL 10924, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirmative defenses inadequate to justify waiver, holding 
plaintiff’s claims adjuster, to whom law firm delegated discretion to settle claims, was the person that would have 
been misled by alleged misrepresentations and concluding that because plaintiff’s allegations directly implicated the 
adjuster’s knowledge, the adjuster was required to produce notes written by him (or his attorneys), but not other 
documents that might have been useful, but not essential)).  
12
not faced with facts which suggested that the later-retained attorney’s own conduct was at least 
one proximate cause of plaintiff’s malpractice-caused injury. 
E. Pappas v. Holloway 
Contrast Pappas,37 in which the facts suggested the later-retained attorney’s conduct 
might have been at least one proximate cause of the malpractice injury.  Pappas focused heavily 
on the temporal sequence of representations to determine whether implied waiver was proper – 
however, it was not the sequence in and of itself that was critical, but the fact that, on the facts, 
examination of the sequence made clear which attorney could possibly have played a substantial 
role in bringing about the malpractice event.  Pappas expressly distinguished Jakobleff and, in 
particular, responded to its concern that privilege not be rendered “illusory” by the way a court 
analyzed the privilege. 
The Pappas litigation began, like many malpractice cases, with the attorney trying to 
compel the client to pay legal fees.38 The client-defendants, the Holloways, had been sued in the 
underlying action for selling infected cattle. During the course of the underlying litigation, they 
were represented by four different attorneys, including plaintiff Pappas, who withdrew as 
counsel prior to trial.  After a finding of liability against them at trial, the Holloways' insurer 
settled. The Holloways then refused to pay Pappas, Pappas sued for his fees and the Holloways 
counterclaimed for malpractice. Pappas then brought third-party claims against the attorneys who 
represented the Holloways subsequent to his representation of them, including the underlying 
case trial attorney.  Pappas sought notes and correspondence regarding the cattle litigation from 
 
37 Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990). 
 
38 114 Wash.2d at 200, 787 P.2d at 32. 
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the third-party defendant attorneys who, in turn, argued the documents were privileged, and 
Pappas moved to compel.   
The Pappas Court held the Holloways had placed their communications with the later-
retained attorneys "at issue" when they counterclaimed against Pappas for malpractice.39 Pappas 
argued his legal advice was not the proximate cause of the Holloway's damages and that any 
damages suffered were caused by the inadequate representation of the third-party defendant 
attorneys which he impleaded.  The Pappas Court distinguished cases where malpractice could 
not be attributed to attorneys because they were hired after the events allegedly constituting the 
malpractice.40 Under this reasoning, the Pappas Court distinguished Jakobleff:
We agree with the concerns raised in Jakobleff regarding the danger of making 
illusory the attorney-client privilege in legal malpractice actions. However, we 
find Jakobleff distinguishable . . . plaintiff's present attorney in Jakobleff did not 
participate in the underlying litigation which gave rise to the malpractice claim 
against the defendants.  Nor did the defendants' third-party complaint against 
plaintiff's present attorney allege involvement in securing a proper settlement in 
the underlying divorce proceedings. Instead, plaintiff's present attorney was 
impleaded on the damage issue only.  Consequently, any communications 
between this attorney and plaintiff, which would have taken place after the 
underlying divorce became final, would have no effect upon the malpractice issue 
raised in plaintiff's complaint.  This is significantly different from the case before 
us wherein Pappas has alleged the same cause of action against the third-party 
defendants as the Holloways have alleged against him. Communications between 
the Holloways and third-party defendants . . . are relevant not only to the issue of 
damages and contribution, but are also relevant to the malpractice issue raised by 
the Holloways in their counterclaim.  For this reason, we find Jakobleff 
inapposite.41 (Emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the Pappas court concluded: 
 
39 114 Wash.2d at 206, 787 P.2d at 35. 
40 114 Wash.2d at 204, 787 P.2d at 34-35 (distinguishing Miller v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.3d 390, 168 
Cal.Rptr. 589 (1980)(post-malpractice communications), Dyson v. Hempe, 140 Wis.2d 792, 413 N.W.2d 379 
(1987)(same) and Lohman v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.3d 90, 146 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1978) (same)). 
 
41 114 Wash.2d at 206, 787 P.2d at 35-36.  The italicized language “would have no effect” is critical, showing 
that the key is causation of malpractice injury. The temporal sequence of events is significant because, in Pappas, it 
determined which attorney could have caused the injury at issue. 
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[T]he Holloways cannot counterclaim against Pappas for malpractice and at the 
same time conceal from him communications which have a direct bearing on this 
issue simply because the attorney-client privilege protects them. To do so would 
in effect enable them to use as a sword the protection which the Legislature 
awarded them as a shield. . .42 
The Pappas Court, relying on Hearn,43 concluded an implied waiver occurred: 
[T]he record supports an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to all 
the attorneys who were involved in defending the Holloways in the underlying 
litigation. First, the Holloways counterclaimed against Pappas for malpractice. 
This affirmative act was the catalyst which caused Pappas to file his third-party 
complaints against the other attorneys involved. Second, the Holloways' 
counterclaim itself caused malpractice to become an issue in this litigation. 
Pappas' claims against third-party defendants are virtually identical to the claims 
made against him by the Holloways . . . to allow the Holloways to block Pappas' 
request for communications . . . would effectively deny him an adequate defense. 
In order for the Holloways to prove Pappas committed malpractice, they will have 
to show, among other things, that Pappas had a duty to exercise the care and skill 
of a reasonably prudent attorney and that Pappas failed to meet this duty. . . . 
Contrary to the Holloways' claim that the only information relevant to this issue is 
what actually happened, this inquiry will involve examining decisions made at 
various stages of the underlying litigation. This will necessarily involve 
information communicated between these attorneys and the Holloways. This is 
particularly true given that Pappas was not the attorney who actually tried the 
case, nor did he have any part in its eventual settlement.44 
F. Conclusions 
In Jakobleff, the malpractice lawyer’s conduct was not “at issue” because it could not 
have been a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. The alleged malpractice was a factually and 
analytically distinct event in which the later-retained attorney’s conduct  played no part.  In 
Pappas, because the later-retained lawyers’ conduct could have been a proximate cause of 
plaintiff’s malpractice-caused injury, the privileged communication was “at issue” because it was 
 
42 114 Wash.2d at 208, 787 P.2d at 36. 
 
43 68 F.R.D. 574 (D.C. Wash. 1975). 
 
44 114 Wash.2d at 209, 787 P.2d at 37. 
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relevant to malpractice liability and, also, to the quantum of potential damages. If disclosure 
were not required in Pappas, the privilege would have been converted into a weapon.   
Permitting discovery of communications in cases like Pappas does not render privilege 
“illusory” in all malpractice cases, the concern in Jakobleff, because waiver would, per the 
Pappas Court, only be found where the later-retained lawyer’s conduct could be a proximate 
cause of plaintiff’s malpractice-caused injury.  In all other cases, including cases asserting 
mitigation-type defenses, as in Jakobleff, privilege remains a shield.  Notably, one district court 
has summarized a number of the policies underlying the implied waiver decisions in the context 
of impleader of current counsel in malpractice cases, i.e., the situation in Jakobleff, focusing on 
both the negative aspects of impleader,45 and what it referred to as “countervailing policies.”46 
II. The No Waiver Cases – Jakobleff and its Progeny
A. Introduction 
Cases applying Jakobleff have focused on three questions: (1) whether the 
communication sought to be discovered took place at or about the time of the litigation in which 
the malpractice is alleged to have occurred, (2) whether the communication could have been part 
 
45 Mirch v. Frank, 295 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1184 (D.Nev. 2003)(“First, the attorney accused of malpractice can 
use impleader as a nefarious litigation tactic by spreading chaos in the opposing camp and creating a conflict of 
interest that would force the client's current counsel to withdraw or be disqualified. . . Second, such an action would 
interfere with the attorney-client confidences of the client. . .  Third, the use of impleader in this circumstance could 
interfere with the ability of the client to pursue such a malpractice claim as a successor attorney, wary of a potential 
impleader claim for malpractice brought by the former attorney, might not act in the best interests of the client in 
pursuing the claim. . . This might have a chilling effect on malpractice claims. . .  Fourth, the attorney's duty runs to 
the client, and not the former attorney, and to subject the successor attorney to a suit by the former attorney would 
force the successor attorney to confront "potential conflicts of interest in trying to serve two masters." (Citations 
omitted.”). 
 
46 Id. at 1185 (“First, a successor counsel could escape liability if a former attorney was prohibited from using 
impleader to hold the successor attorney accountable for malpractice. . . Second, it would be unfair to allow the 
client to sue former counsel for malpractice and yet, at the same time, claim attorney-client privilege with the 
successor counsel, thereby limiting former counsel's access to relevant evidence. . . Third, the successor counsel's 
"position of trust with and influence over the client ... could create a situation ripe for mischief and manipulation" if 
the successor counsel fails to disclose his own negligence to the client. . . Finally, disallowing the use of impleader 
could dull the successor counsel's incentives to act as carefully and diligently for the client since the successor 
counsel would be less likely to face malpractice liability after replacing former counsel.” (Citations omitted)). 
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of the alleged malpractice and (3) whether the content of such communication is really relevant 
to the question of liability raised by the malpractice pleading, rather than the extent of damages.  
Case have generally reflected at least three important underlying policies: (1) that the 
attorney-client privilege, meant to be a shield, should not be used as a sword to defeat the 
attorney accused of malpractice from defending the claim,47 (2) that the malpractice defendant 
should not, by artful pleading of defenses, be able to determine whether privilege should be 
invaded (rather, courts should focus on whether the later-retained attorney’s conduct could have 
been part of the malpractice event which proximately caused some or part of plaintiff’s claim), 
and (3) whether the content of the otherwise protected communications is reasonably available 
from other sources,48 possibly at other stages of litigation.49 
Jakobleff’s progeny heavily rely on a distinction between evidence probative of the extent 
of damages and evidence probative of the cause of damages.50 Privilege will be invaded where 
 
47 See, e.g., Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 693, 756 A.2d 526, 538  (Md.App. 
2000)(“the client cannot use the advice of a professional as sword to prove the client's case against former counsel 
while at the same time asserting the privilege as a shield to prevent disclosing harmful information.’). 
48 See Allen v. West Point-Pepperell Inc., 848 F. Supp. 423, 430 (S.D.N.Y.1994)(declining to disregard the 
privilege where counsel's advice had no bearing on the resolution of an unreasonable delay defense -- issue in 
adjudicating laches allegation was not what legal advice attorney gave plaintiffs or what plaintiffs said to counsel, 
but what facts plaintiffs knew regarding alleged fraud, when they became aware of same, and their state of mind). 
 
49 In Standard Chartered Bank PLC, 111 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), plaintiff ("SCB") sued defendant 
(“Ayala”) for breach of contract and fraud regarding Ayala’s guaranty of loans SCB made to Behring International 
Inc. (“Behring”).  Ayala counterclaimed, alleging SCB made misrepresentations to Ayala regarding SCB's loans to 
Behring, arguing Ayala bought its interest in Behring based on SCB's agreement that SCB would not declare 
Behring in default of the outstanding SCB-Behring loan agreements and would allow a gradual repayment. SCB 
sought all communications between Ayala and its attorneys concerning Ayala's acquisition of Behring. SCB argued 
Ayala waived privilege by alleging reliance on SCB's oral representations. The Court held that what is relevant to 
the counterclaims was not what counsel said to Ayala or what Ayala said to counsel, but what Ayala knew or should 
reasonably have been expected to know prior to acquiring the Behring stock. Id. at 81-82. Although it would be 
“convenient” for SCB to learn the substance of Ayala’s communications with its attorneys and might reveal some of 
what Ayala knew, other means of obtaining the information were available, given Ayala would have to disclose 
what it knew in discovery.   
 
50 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 183, 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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the evidence relates to the causation of the malpractice injury, but not merely the quantum of 
alleged damages. 
B. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,51 illustrates how 
the Serial Representation Cases focus on the distinction between vital information and 
convenient information, their worry that artful pleading of affirmative defenses could be used to 
manipulate the privilege, and the rule that implied waiver must be carefully limited to only the 
most exigent circumstances.  Arkwright involved a clean up of environmental contamination at a 
General Electric Company ("GE") facility. Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company 
("National Union") moved to compel production of documents prepared by the accounting firm 
for Arkwright, Matson, Driscoll & Damico ("Matson Driscoll"), in connection with its 
adjustment of GE's claim.52 National Union also moved to compel either identification or 
production of documents pertaining to alleged fraudulent billing for clean-up services by 
EmTech Environmental Services, Inc. ("EmTech"), at the GE site.53 These documents were then 
in the possession of law firm Podvey, Sachs, Meanor, Catenacci, Hildner & Cocoziello ("Podvey 
Sachs"), Arkwright's counsel in prior litigation brought by Arkwright and GE against EmTech.   
National Union sought the claims file for Arkwright's subrogation investigation, then in 
the possession of the law firm that conducted that investigation, Jones Gregg Creehan & Gerace 
("Jones Gregg") and, also, production of Arkwright's underwriting file for the GE policy and 
portions of a GE consultant’s claim file.54 
51 1994 WL 510043 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1994). 
 
52 1994 WL 510043 at *2. 
 
53 Id.
54 Id.
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Arkwright argued that bringing suit for insurance coverage did not effect a waiver of 
privilege and that defendant's claims that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages and adjust a claim 
in good faith were not “affirmative acts” that put counsel's conduct “in issue,” waiving 
privilege.55 The court, after commenting that numerous cases had narrowly construed Hearn,56 
observed that "at issue" waiver occurs where a party puts the content of an attorney-client 
communication at issue by asserting a claim or defense which it intends to prove through 
disclosure of that communication.57 It also noted if a defendant could justify invading privilege 
by virtue of pleading of affirmative defenses, the skilled pleader could always render privilege a 
nullity.58 For that reason, it concluded, privilege should only be invaded where necessary:   
Even where a party's state of knowledge is particularly at issue, such as in a case 
involving claims of laches or justifiable reliance, waiver of the privilege should 
not be implied because the relevant question is not what legal advice was given or 
what information was conveyed to counsel, but what facts the party knew and 
when. . . the discovering party should simply inquire directly of the other party as 
to its knowledge of relevant facts, which must be disclosed. . . . . Invasion of the 
privilege may, however, be warranted where the specific content of legal advice 
received must be shown to prove a claim or a defense.59 
The court rejected National Union’s argument that invasion of the privilege was 
necessary to evaluate whether Arkwright adjusted the GE claim in good faith.60 That question 
 
55 1994 WL 510043, at *11-14. 
 
56 Id. at *11. 
 
57 Id. at *12. 
 
58 The Arkwright court, 1994 WL 510043, at *11, cited North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance 
Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 370-371 (D.N.J.1992)(placing the broad question of reinsurance coverage in issue did not 
make it “fair game” for discovery), Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 57, 59 
(S.D.N.Y.1984)(“It cannot be possible for [a defendant] to justify breaching [plaintiff’s] privilege by reason of its 
own pleading of an affirmative defense. That would give an adversary who is a skillful pleader the ability to tender 
the privilege a nullity.”).  
 
59 1994 WL 510043, at *12.   
 
60 Id. at *12-13. 
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did not turn on counsel’s advice because reinsurers are not permitted to second guess good faith 
liability determinations made by reinsureds or a reinsured's good faith decision to waive 
defenses.61 Thus, the court rejected the waiver argument:  
I am unconvinced that the "at issue" doctrine justifies waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege in the present case. Regardless of whose burden it ultimately will be at 
trial to prove the good faith adjustment of the GE claim or the reasonableness of 
the EmTech settlement, National Union has not demonstrated that the content of 
legal advice received by Arkwright in any of the contested documents is directly 
relevant to either Arkwright's claims or National Union's defenses. Arkwright has 
not placed its good faith adjustment of the underlying GE claim at issue simply by 
suing for indemnity . . . Arkwright has not made specific allegations that make an 
issue of its counsel's conduct. Finally, National Union has not shown that 
Arkwright intends to prove its damages or its good faith adjustment of the GE 
claim through disclosure of the contested documents. Although the protected 
communications here may well contain some factual information that would be 
useful to National Union, National Union has not shown that such information is 
not available through depositions and interrogatories.62 (Emphasis added). 
 
The court rejected contrary authority, including Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. 
Continental Casualty Co.,63 which held that because certain attorney-client communications 
would shed light on relevant issues, the attorney-client privilege had been waived.64 In the 
court’s view, that case’s “broad construction” of the “at issue” waiver doctrine would render 
“discovery privilege meaningless.”65 Privilege under Arkwright applies only where the content 
of legal advice must be shown to prove a claim or a defense and this occurs only where the 
content of the communication is “directly relevant” to claims or defenses.66 
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at *14 (citing 142 F.R.D. 471 (D.Colo.1992)). 
 
64 1994 WL 510043, at *14. 
 
65 Id.
66 Id. at *13. 
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Restated, unless the communication’s content is highly probative of a claim or defense 
and that content cannot  be obtained by any reasonable, alternative means, the interest in 
protecting the privilege supercedes the convenience of the litigant in marshalling his or her proof 
through disclosure of  protected communications.67 Prototypical cases in which waiver would be 
found, the court suggested, would be cases in which a party raised direct reliance on an 
attorney’s legal advice as to legality of a transaction and that advice could not be shown in any 
way other than disclosure of the communication.68 
C. H & D Steel Service, Inc. v. Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley 
H & D Steel Service, Inc. v. Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley,69 focuses on what 
the term “vital” actually means, how that concept inter-relates to the possibility of disclosure 
during different stages of litigation, and how the courts relate the concept of “vital information” 
to the malpractice injury through causal language, e.g., conduct “remote from” or “tangential to” 
a legal injury.  Plaintiff H & D Steel Service, Inc. ("H&D") was held in contempt for failing to 
produce documents to defendant law firm Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley ("Weston") 
in a malpractice action H&D filed against Weston.70 
H&D had retained Weston to protect its rights as a creditor in dealing with its customer, 
Transue & Williams Stamping Company ("T&W").  H&D had brokered goods to T&W, on 
credit, and H&D had hired Weston to secure the debt if T&W defaulted. Weston prepared legal 
 
67 Id. at *12-14. 
 
68 Id. at *12.  Determining the quality of “reliance” has proved complicated. See generally In Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 183, 193 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 
69 1998 WL 413772  (Ohio App. 1998). 
 
70 Id., at *1.  
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documents for that purpose.71 T&W filed for bankruptcy at which time H&D was owed about 
$1.6 million.  In an adversary proceeding, T&W alleged H&D's security interests were defective 
and sought to set aside its debt to H&D. H&D discharged Weston and retained law firm 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan and Aronoff (BFCA), which eventually compromised the debt and 
negotiated a settlement between H&D and T&W.72 
H&D filed a legal malpractice action against Weston alleging it negligently prepared the 
security documents, preventing it from realizing the full value of its claim against T&W.73 
Weston sought compensation for unpaid legal services and sought BFCA's file, including a letter 
from BFCA to H&D that discussed the settlement between H&D and T&W and which had set 
forth BFCA's opinion as to the merits of the adversary proceeding and recommended strategy.74 
H&D refused to produce the letter, claiming it was privileged, and Weston moved to compel. 
Weston’s motion was granted. When H&D refused to produce the letter, the court found it in 
contempt.75 
On appeal, H&D denied that its malpractice action put the subject communication at 
issue and that its communications with BFCA were relevant to its malpractice claim against 
Weston.  H&D also denied that the information at issue was “vital” to Weston’s defense and that 
a waiver should be implied.76 The appellate court observed H&D’s malpractice claim was 
framed on a negligence theory, i.e., but for Weston’s negligence in preparing documents, it 
 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
 
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *2. 
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would not have suffered monetary loss, notwithstanding T&W's bankruptcy. The question was 
whether the information at issue was vital enough to pierce the privileged and that question 
depended on how the content of the communication related to Weston’s defense and H&D’s 
liability theory. The court wrote: 
[W]e fail to see how the requested information is vital to Weston Hurd's defense. 
"Vital" information necessarily implies that the information is unavailable from 
any other source. . . . While it claims that the requested information is vital to its 
understanding of the reasonableness of the settlement, Weston Hurd has not 
demonstrated that this information could not be obtained from any other source.
In fact, at the time Weston Hurd filed its motion to compel, no witnesses had yet 
been deposed and discovery had only minimally been undertaken.77 (Emphasis 
added). 
 
In the above quote, the court defined “vital information” as implying that the information 
at issue is not unavailable from any other source or at any other point in a litigation.  However, 
the word “vital” was also used to identify information that could support a viable defense – 
information a court perceives cannot support such a defense is not “vital” in a different sense: 
The former attorney in Pappas was discharged while the matter was pending. 
Successor counsel entered the case in midcourse and took the case to trial, which 
resulted in an unfavorable judgment and ultimately settled. Thus, whether the 
former attorney violated the standard of care could not have been determined 
without resort to the records of successor counsel.  While on their face the cases 
appear similar, they are not so. It is true that Weston Hurd was discharged during 
the adversary proceeding, but it is not the adversary proceeding on which the legal 
malpractice action is based. On the contrary, it is Weston Hurd's involvement 
prior to this proceeding of which H&D Steel complains. Thus, Weston Hurd's 
alleged negligence was already complete at the time of the adversary proceeding. 
BFCA's subsequent involvement as successor counsel did not in any way 
encroach upon the legal services rendered by Weston Hurd. Thus, the information 
sought is not vital to Weston Hurd's defense, as was the information sought in 
Pappas.78(Emphasis added). 
 
Turning to Jakobleff, the court held: 
 
77 Id. at *4.  
 
78 Id, at *5.   
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The instant case is more analogous to Jakobleff. . . a case distinguished by the 
Pappas court. . . The Jakobleff court held that disclosure of communications 
between plaintiff and successor counsel were not necessary in order for former 
counsel to successfully assert a defense. The court reasoned that successor 
counsel was involved, as in this case, on the question of damages only -- an issue 
that could only have arisen after the professional responsibilities of former 
counsel had ended. As such, the privileged communication was unrelated to the 
alleged malpractice of former counsel, as it is in this case.79 
Although Weston alluded to alleged illegal activities as possible factors in BFCS’ 
decision to compromise the T&W debt in the adversary proceeding, the court held that even if 
such factors were relevant, they were either “tangential to” or “remote from” the precise legal 
questions arising from plaintiff’s malpractice theory,80 which was tied to events which preceded 
the adversary proceeding.  Factors that might have contributed to some aspect of the negotiation 
of the settlement, it concluded, would not be central to whether Weston acted as a reasonably 
prudent attorney, prior to the adversary proceeding.81 Even if BFCA document information 
might have effected Weston's strategy, it bore little relation to Weston’s ability to defend the 
malpractice charges against it.82 
Thus, per Weston Hurd, where a court perceives information being sought is “tangential” 
to the malpractice (where it could not be at least one proximate cause of malpractice injury) or 
where alternative, non-privileged sources allow access to information, privilege is respected.83 
79 Id.
80 Id. 
81 Id.
82 Id. 
83 Because H&D would need to attack the “reasonableness” of settlement through an expert, the court 
concluded that Weston, at a later point in the litigation, could uncover the operative facts upon which H&D’s 
expert's opinion would be based, eliminating the need to invade the privilege. Id.
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D. Fischel v. Van Straaten Galleries 
Fischel v. Van Straaten Galleries,84 distinguishes pleadings which put damages “at issue” 
from pleadings which put the cause of damages at issue, and mere convenience, which does not 
justify invading the privilege, from information vital to the defense of the case, which does.  Law 
firm Fischel & Kahn (“F&K”) sued its former client Van Straaten Galleries (“VSG”) for 
attorneys' fees and VSG counter-claimed for malpractice, alleging F&K was negligent in drafting 
certain contractual limitation of liability language.85 After F&K had drafted the language, but 
before the litigation in which the limitation clause was at issue, VSG replaced F&K with law 
firm Pope & John (“P&J”).86 F&K sought to discover communication between VSG and 
attorneys  who subsequently represented VSG in the underlying action, including P&J, which 
were not parties or counsel in the malpractice action.87 
F&K argued the documents were critical to its defense of the malpractice action because 
it could not otherwise determine the extent to which VSG’s loss resulted from P&J’s alleged 
malpractice.  F&K argued VSG waived privilege as to its communications with P&J by suing for 
malpractice.  The trial court ordered disclosure of certain documents under a theory of implied 
waiver; F&K refused to produce and was held in contempt.88 The intermediate appellate court 
affirmed,89 but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.   
 
84 189 Ill.2d 579, 727 N.E.2d 240, 244 Ill.Dec.941  (Ill. 2000). 
 
85 189 Ill.2d at 580, 727 N.E.2d at 241, 244 Ill.Dec. at 942.   
 
86 189 Ill.2d at 581-582, 727 N.E.2d at 241-242, 244 Ill.Dec. at 941.  
 
87 189 Ill.2d at 582-583, 727 N.E.2d at 242, 244 Ill.Dec. at 943. 
 
88 189 Ill.2d at 582-583, 727 N.E.2d at 242, 244 Ill.Dec. at 943. 
 
89 189 Ill.2d at 583-584, 727 N.E.2d at 242-243, 244 Ill.Dec. at 943-944. 
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On appeal, F&K argued Pappas was controlling, but the Court found Jakobleff 
apposite.90 Although filing the malpractice claim waived the privilege as to F&K, it concluded, 
VSG’s conduct did not waive the privilege as to P&J.  As in Jakobleff, as later-hired attorneys, 
P&J could not have been involved in the alleged malpractice against VSG. There was no 
question which attorney might be liable for the malpractice because F&K’s alleged negligence 
was complete before P&J was retained.  Thus, Pappas was inapposite.  F&K’s affirmative 
defenses, the court found, were analogous to the third-party claim for contribution in Jakobleff.91 
If F&K could invade the privilege by simply filing defenses, the privilege would be illusory.92 
Although the filing was sufficient to put damages at issue, it did not put the cause of 
VSG’s damages “at issue,”93 and that was the basis of the court’s refusal to permit privilege to be 
compromised.  The Fishel Court also relied on Miller v. Superior Court,94 which held that an 
attorney defendant could not discover communications with attorneys hired after his 
representation ended lest it: “create an intolerable burden on the attorney client privilege, making 
it very difficult for the parties to the relationship to openly discuss matters which might 
eventually lead to litigation.”95 The Miller court had reconciled  Merritt v. Superior Court,96 and 
 
90 189 Ill.2d at 586-590, 727 N.E.2d at 244-246, 244-266,  Ill.Dec. at 944. 
 
91 189 Ill.2d at 586, 727 N.E.2d at 244, 244 Ill.Dec. at 945. 
 
92 189 Ill.2d at 586-587, 727 N.E.2d at 244-245, 244 Ill.Dec. at 945-946. 
93 Id.
94 111 Cal.App.3d 390, 168 Cal.Rptr. 589, 590 (1980).   
 
95 Fishel, 727 N.E.2d at 244 (citing Miller, 111 Cal.App.3d at 394-95, 168 Cal.Rptr. at 591). 
 
96 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 88 Cal.Rptr. 377 (1970). Merritt was a bad-faith case in which the insured argued the 
insurer’s counsel had so “confused” the underlying plaintiff’s counsel, that settlement became impossible.  The 
insurer sought to discover plaintiff’s communications with his then attorney during preparation of the underlying 
action.  The Merritt Court upheld disclosure, concluding plaintiff placed “in issue” the “decisions, conclusions and 
mental state of his then attorney by alleging his confusion led to the failure to settle.” 111 Cal.App.3d at 394.  
Because plaintiff had “intended to prove his case by reference to the mental state of his counsel, the defendant was 
entitled to inquire into communications related to that state.” Id.
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Lohman v. Superior Court,97 distinguishing cases where plaintiff puts in issue counsel's own 
state of mind from cases in which only plaintiff's  knowledge is placed in issue.98 The case 
before the Fishel Court was fundamentally about damages:  
That van Straaten’s damages are subject to dispute by the parties does not mean 
that van Straaten has waived its attorney-client privilege regarding 
communications between it and Pope & John that might touch on that question.  If 
raising the issue of damages in a legal malpractice action automatically resulted in 
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to subsequently retained 
counsel, then the privilege would be unjustifiably curtailed. See Schlumberger 
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal.App.3d 386, 393, 171 Cal.Rptr. 413, 417 (1981).99 
Nondisclosure of VSG’s communications with P&J would not prevent F&K from 
challenging VSG’s evidence on the damage issue: 
Nondisclosure of van Straaten's communications with Pope & John about the 
course and conduct of the Mesirow litigation will not prevent Fischel & Kahn 
 
97 81 Cal.App.3d 90, 146 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1978). In Lohman, defendant pleaded a limitations affirmative 
defense and argued that because plaintiff was aware of defendant's role when the complaint was filed, plaintiff could 
not claim relation-back to the initial complaint. Defendant sought information from plaintiff's counsel concerning 
his communications with her, attempting to show when the plaintiff became aware of defendant's involvement.  The 
court held such discovery would be improper not because what plaintiff knew was privileged, but because what she 
may have told her attorney was.
98 Although Miller's knowledge was in issue, this did not waive privilege as to communications with attorneys 
she consulted after the alleged malpractice. Privilege is not waived, the Miller Court concluded, merely because 
disclosure of counsel’s communications might help establish plaintiff’s state of mind; doing so would impair the 
attorney-client relationship.  Under Miller, where plaintiff’s state of mind, but not the attorney’s state of mind, is in 
issue, the policies supporting the privilege supercede the policies supporting the truth-finding process. 
 
99 Id. at 244-45. In Schlumberger, petitioner sued law firm Kindel & Anderson (K&A) for failing to properly 
obtain certain security interests. Petitioner retained different law firms to represent it in a bankruptcy in connection 
with those security interests.  After a settlement, petitioner claimed K&A’s negligence caused its losses.  K&A, 
however, argued petitioner's injuries were caused by its decision to enter into an inadequate settlement, effectively, a 
failure to properly  mitigate caused by its later hired lawyers.  K&A cross-claimed against petitioner’s bankruptcy 
lawyers, alleging their negligence caused petitioner’s loss.  K&A sought correspondence between petitioner and 
bankruptcy counsel, but the Court refused to require production:  “Communications between a client and an attorney 
representing the client in a malpractice action against a former attorney are privileged and not subject to discovery, 
and the privilege is not waived by tendering an issue on which the requested information may be relevant.” 115 
Cal.App.3d at 394, 171 Cal.Rptr. at 418. The key language was “may be relevant.”  The fact that the defense being 
raised “might be” bolstered by disclosure of a privileged communications was not enough to place the 
communication “at issue.” Neither Jakobleff, which inquired as to whether the communications were “required to 
determine the validity of the client’s claim” or would “deprive the adversary of vital information,” nor the 
Schlumberger Court, which focused on whether the information sought to be disclosed was “vital” or “necessary,” 
found the mere possibility that a party’s position would be furthered by production a sufficient basis to overcome the 
privilege. 
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from challenging van Straaten's evidence on the issue of damages. Evidence 
regarding the client's damages resulting from the law firm's alleged negligence 
would, in the present context, be readily available to either party. Thus, we cannot 
conclude here, as the court did in Pappas, that the requested information is vital to 
the lawyer's defense of the malpractice action.  . . . we believe that the better 
approach is set forth in Jakobleff and Miller.100 
F&K argued that it needed to review all the documents to address the issue of damages, 
but the court rejected the argument: 
[W]e disagree with Fischel & Kahn's assertion that, without reviewing all the 
documents surrounding the Mesirow litigation and its settlement, it is impossible 
to determine whether and to what extent van Straaten's alleged loss resulted from 
Fischel & Kahn's alleged malpractice, if any, or some other source. Here, the 
privileged documents present one alternative means, though perhaps the most 
convenient, in which this information may be obtained. Mere convenience, 
however, should not justify waiver of the attorney-client privilege.101 
III. Cases in which Implied Waiver has been Found -- Pappas and its Progeny 
A. Introduction 
In Serial Representation Cases, it may be difficult to separate damages caused in one 
action from damages caused in another. Where any part of the damages plaintiff alleges can be 
traced to an attorney’s conduct, a court may find implied waiver, if the malpractice defendant 
convinces the court that the information is vital to its defense and that another attorney caused 
the injury.  
B. Rutgard v. Haynes 
In Rutgard v. Haynes,102 for example, privilege was waived because the court determined 
that a later hired attorney’s conduct could have been a proximate cause of one component of 
damages arising from an inter-related series of law suits. The court found that because the 
 
100 727 N.E.2d at 245-246. 
101 Id.
102 185 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
28
malpractice damages that plaintiff alleged arose from two different actions, the content of the 
communication(s) was relevant to both causation and damages even though the conduct of the 
later hired attorney occurred after the alleged malpractice.   
Rutgard involved a particularly complicated series of intertwined litigations. The 
problems began when plaintiff Rutgard, represented by attorney Haynes, lost an antitrust case 
filed against certain of his former employees (the “Antitrust Action”).  The employees then sued 
Rutgard (and Haynes) for malicious prosecution and Rutgard retained attorney Royce, to defend 
him in that action (the “Malicious Prosecution Action”).  A criminal action was then filed against 
Rutgard (the “Criminal Action”), and Rutgard hired Haynes to represent him in the Criminal 
Action.  Rutgard then retained Royce, to sue Haynes for professional malpractice alleging 
Haynes committed malpractice in the Antitrust Action (the “Malpractice Action”).   
Haynes, as defendant in the Malpractice Action, moved to compel production of 
documents from Royce, then acting as plaintiff’s malpractice counsel.  Haynes argued that 
Rutgard waived the attorney client privilege in the Malicious Prosecution Action by 
communicating with Royce, who acted as his malicious prosecution counsel. 
The Court, relying on Pappas, observed it had previously held Plaintiff can waive the 
attorney client privilege: “when a client sues one lawyer for malpractice, the attorney-client 
privilege is waived as to all attorneys involved in the underlying litigation for which that attorney 
has been sued.”103 Plaintiff’s malpractice claim against Haynes sought monies Plaintiff paid to 
Royce to defend and settle the Malicious Prosecution Action.  Haynes argued that because 
Plaintiff placed both the fees and settlement monies “in issue,” the Antitrust and Malicious 
Prosecution Action files in Royce’s possession had to be produced.   
 
103 Id. at 597-598. 
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The Court noted that Royce became Plaintiff’s counsel after the alleged malpractice had 
occurred in the Antitrust Action and it framed the issue as follows:  
[T]his Court  must consider whether Plaintiff has waived the attorney-client 
privilege as to communication between himself and Royce during the malicious 
prosecution case by virtue of now attempting to recover damages from Defendant 
Haynes for Royce’s attorney’s fees, and the settlement payment Plaintiff paid to 
terminate the malicious prosecution case.104 
The Rutgard Court then stated that a party does not place otherwise privileged attorney-
client communications "at issue" merely by seeking an award of attorney fees as damages, citing 
Jakobleff and Fischel.105 Had Plaintiff merely sought attorney's fees incurred during the 
Malicious Prosecution Action, the court explained, it would have been likely to have found 
Plaintiff had not waived the attorney-client privilege and would, possibly, have just ordered 
production of time sheets or other records to allow defendant some discovery as to the 
“reasonableness” of fees being sought.106 However, because Plaintiff was not just trying to 
recover fees incurred in the Malicious Prosecution Action, but monies paid to settle it, plaintiff’s 
pleading put the “reasonableness” of the settlement  amount  "in issue," as well as its fees.107 
Citing Pappas and Fischel, the Rutgard Court explained that although no waiver occurs 
where (1) the attorney is retained after the acts constituting the alleged malpractice and (2) no 
issues of proximate cause could arise as to who committed the alleged malpractice (in the 
Antitrust Action), a waiver had, nonetheless, occurred. Royce, by settling the Malicious 
Prosecution Action, brought his own conduct into question because, if he negligently settled the 
 
104 Id. at 598. 
 
105 Id. at 599. 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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Malicious Prosecution Action, it might be a proximate cause of at least one part of plaintiff’s 
damages arising from that settlement: 
[B]y claiming damages here for the settlement Plaintiff paid in the malicious 
prosecution action, the "underlying action" during which "issues of proximate 
cause can arise as to who committed the malpractice" must include both the 
antitrust case and the malicious prosecution case. Consequently, Defendant here 
reasonably raises the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, alleging that 
Plaintiff's counsel in the malicious prosecution action, Mr. Royce, could have 
contributed to Plaintiff's settlement damages by committing negligence in the 
conduct of his defense of Rutgard in that action.108 
The Court concluded that Plaintiff put "in issue" Royce's actions defending him and 
recommending settlement, waiving privilege in the Malpractice Action.109 The same result, it 
concluded, followed from consideration of the Hearn test: 
Plaintiff has asserted the privilege here after filing suit against Defendant and 
claiming damages in the amount of the settlement he paid in the malicious 
prosecution suit. Second, Defendant has shown that the protected information may 
be relevant to the element of causation and to his affirmative defense of 
contributory negligence, as well as on the issue of the reasonableness of the 
damages claimed. Defendant needs access to materials from the entire malicious 
prosecution case to defend against the allegation that his alleged negligence 
during the handling of the prior antitrust suit was in fact the proximate cause of 
the settlement elected to be paid by Plaintiff in the malicious prosecution suit. 
Third, application of the attorney-client privilege would deny Defendant access to 
the relevant information available regarding this aspect of his defense herein.
This Court finds that Plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to 
communications between himself and Mr. Royce concerning Royce's defense of 
the malicious prosecution suit.110 (Emphasis added). 
 
In the Jakobleff-controlled cases discussed in Part II, the question was whether the later-
retained attorney’s conduct could proximately have caused the malpractice-injury.  Courts 
distinguished the chain of injury-causing events from their consequences and, if the content of 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 600. 
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the communication was relevant only to the extent of damages, but not the causation/liability 
issue, there would be no disclosure.111 In Rutgard, the court could not wholly separate the 
damages caused by Haynes’ malpractice in losing the Antitrust Action from the damages Royce 
was accused of causing in reaching the settlement in the Malicious Prosecution Action.  
Plaintiff’s own pleading of the amount of the settlement in Malicious Prosecution Action, not 
Royce’s responsive pleading, had placed Royce’s conduct in the later action “in issue” because it 
could have been a “cause” of at least one part of the damages Plaintiff sought.  
Restated, the Rutgard Court found a waiver occurred despite the fact Royce’s conduct 
occurred after the events underlying the Antitrust Action malpractice -- Royce’s conduct could 
be viewed as one proximate cause of that part of the client’s damages arising from the settlement 
of the Malicious Prosecution Action.  The concerns expressed in Jakobleff were avoided because 
defendant had not artfully pleaded defenses to  circumvent the privilege; rather, the claims 
Plaintiff chose to plead resulted in a waiver which was necessary to permit Haynes to defend 
himself – that is, to obtain vital information.   
C. IMO Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C. 
In IMO Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C.,112 a client sued its former counsel 
for malpractice arising from an insurance coverage litigation.  Former counsel was alleged to 
have negligently drafted a joint stipulation in an action filed in California (the “California 
 
111 But see Goldberg v. Hirschberg, 10 Misc.3d 292, 299-300, 806 N.Y.S.2d 333, 338-339 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 
2005) (where plaintiffs alleged defendants caused them to become targets of government investigations and claimed 
legal fees incurred as damages, scope of investigations was vital to defense; privilege was impliedly waived as to 
any subject related to the reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance on law firm’s advice -- plaintiff had a substantial 
need for the information and could not obtain same by other means without undue hardship: “This Court cannot in 
all fairness permit plaintiffs to hold defendants wholly responsible for their predicament and then allow plaintiffs 
attorneys to deny defendants the opportunity to examine possibly exonerating documents,” distinguishing Jakobleff, 
noting there was evidence that plaintiffs relied on defendants’ legal opinion). 
 
112 192 Misc.2d 605,  746 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2002). 
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Action”).  The case arose when Long Island Lighting Company (“LILCO”) sued a predecessor 
of IMO Industries, Inc. (“IMO”) for selling it a defective generator, resulting in  a large verdict.  
International Insurance Co. (“International”) provided IMO an excess layer of insurance, and 
IMO requested that International participate in settling the litigation.  International paid half, but 
then sought to recover its payment from IMO, which was represented by the law firm Anderson 
Kill & Okick, P.C. (“Anderson”).  
Specifically, Anderson helped draft the Joint Stipulation which included a provision for 
recovery of settlement payments from the insured if non-coverage were proved.  The Judge 
found IMO had no coverage and required IMO to show cause why it should not reimburse 
International's defense and settlement costs under the Joint Stipulation. The court rejected IMO's 
arguments and IMO then terminated Anderson. IMO then retained law firm Farella Braun & 
Martell, LLP ("Farella") to represent it in the California Action, beginning in 1995.  IMO, by 
Farella, settled the California Action in 1997, at which time Farella's representation of IMO in 
that action ended. IMO then sued Anderson, alleging it negligently drafted the Joint Stipulation, 
under which it was required to indemnify payments made by International.  
Anderson sought communications, after March 1995, between IMO employees and 
Farella, and, also, communications between the employees and IMO's general counsel. It argued 
these documents were necessary to prove the Joint Stipulation was competently drafted and that 
IMO would have lost or unfavorably settled the California Action, anyway.  Anderson further 
argued the documents might clarify how IMO's settlement was formulated, as the amount paid in 
settlement was the damage the malpractice action sought to recover.  Finally, Anderson argued 
the documents might show exactly when it had stopped representing IMO, a fact relevant to a 
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limitations defense Anderson asserted.113 Although IMO argued bringing the malpractice action 
did not waive the privilege, Anderson responded that IMO was using the privilege as a sword, 
first putting the California Action at issue, then refusing to produce documents which would 
disclose what happened in that suit.114 IMO relied on Jakobleff and Fischel, but the California 
Action judge distinguished them, following Pappas:  
IMO seeks to extend the reasoning in Jakobleff to communications with Farella, 
where the representation of defendant and Farella is alleged to have been 
concurrent. However, the evil envisaged by the Appellate Division, Second 
Department in Jakobleff is not present here. The California Action is ended, and 
there is no danger that Anderson Kill will invade IMO's ability to communicate 
freely with its present attorney. . . . IMO relies upon the attorney-client privilege 
in seeking to prevent inquiry by Anderson Kill into whether the only possible 
cause of IMO's injury was the November 1994 Joint Stipulation. IMO reads too 
narrowly the scope of inquiry in a legal malpractice case. IMO has the burden of 
proving that its loss is causally related to the alleged act of malpractice, and 
Anderson Kill should be permitted disclosure on that question. . . . disclosure is 
sought only with respect to the subject matter IMO has put in issue. . . . The 
waiver in this case is clearer still, because IMO claims that Farella and Anderson 
Kill concurrently represented it in the California Action, the outcome of which is 
the basis for IMO's alleged harm.115 (Emphasis added). 
 
IMO clarifies a number of distinctions made earlier in Jakobleff and Pappas.
First, where multiple law firms represent the malpractice plaintiff in the same action, 
albeit at different stages of litigation, disclosure of communications between plaintiff and the 
later-retained law firm will not be precluded if the later-representation has ended and disclosure 
will not impair communications between plaintiff and the already dismissed, later-retained 
attorney (or, presumably, current counsel).  Because disclosure of IMO’s communications with 
Farella would not impair counsel’s representation of IMO in the malpractice action, one of the 
 
113 192 Misc.2d at 608,  746 N.Y.S.2d at 574. 
 
114 192 Misc.2d at 608,  746 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. 
 
115 192 Misc.2d at 610, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 576.  
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issues that worried the Jakobleff Court, i.e., impairment of current representation, would be 
inapplicable.   
Second, because Anderson and Farella both represented IMO in the California Action, 
Farella’s settlement of that action, in which the Joint Stipulation had been drafted by Anderson,  
could, conceivably, have been a proximate cause of IMO’s malpractice injury, i.e., the amount 
paid to settle the California Action. The court did find privilege waived because Farella’s 
conduct could have been causally tied to the damages at issue, a result similar to that in Rutgard.
There, errors in the settlement of the Malicious Prosecution Action could have proximately 
caused damages plaintiff sought in the Malpractice Action, even though the attorney settling the 
Malicious Prosecution Action was not the attorney alleged to have committed the Antitrust 
Action malpractice.  If IMO’s settlement, effected by Farella, was improper, it could have been a 
proximate cause of IMO’s damages in the malpractice action even though the client, IMO, did 
not allege malpractice against Farella in any action.   
IMO interprets Jakobleff as standing for the proposition that privilege will not be waived 
unless the communications at issue are relevant to causation – the sequence of representations is, 
therefore, only one factor in causal analysis. The IMO Court also distinguished Fischel & Kahn, 
Ltd. v. Van Straten Gallery, Inc.,116 as follows: 
The law firms' representation [in Fischel & Kahn] of the client overlapped, albeit 
in different matters. . . . Fischel & Kahn is distinguishable from the present action 
because IMO claims not only that the representation by Anderson Kill and Farella 
overlapped, but that they simultaneously represented IMO in the California 
Action.117 
Instead, the IMO Court relied on Pappas:
116 189 Ill.2d 579, 244 Ill.Dec. 941, 727 N.E.2d 240 (2000). 
 
117 192 Misc.2d at 611, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 576-577. 
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In Pappas . . . [t]he Court held that the Holloways waived the attorney-client 
privilege with respect to the other attorneys, stating that "the Holloways cannot 
counterclaim against Pappas for malpractice and at the same time conceal from 
him communications having a direct bearing on this issue." . . . The Court went on 
to say that "[t]he nature of a malpractice claim necessitates inquiry into the 
actions taken during the course of the litigation in question.". . .  I agree.
Therefore, IMO shall produce documents regarding the California Action that it 
has withheld on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. To the extent that the 
withheld material also are communications regarding IMO's other lawsuits or 
communications with IMO's attorney in the present action, the documents may be 
redacted. Not only are the lawsuits other than the California Action not the subject 
of this litigation, so the attorney-client privilege is not waived, the material is not 
relevant.118 
The IMO Court, therefore, made clear that its analysis was a function of the “nature of the 
malpractice claim.”  In both Rutgard and IMO, the temporal sequence of representation was just 
one factor the court considered in determining whether the communications at issue might be 
relevant to an assessment of causation and damages.  Neither case involved attorney conduct 
alleged to have been part of the initial malpractice event.  However, the later hired attorney’s 
conduct could have caused part of the damages the malpractice complaint alleged, not just 
affected the amount of damages. 
D. Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis 
In Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis,119 creditor Simmons was supposed to receive payments 
from a Chapter 11 debtor’s receivable accounts and sued bankruptcy counsel, Willis, alleging 
negligence.  Snyder represented Simmons in both the bankruptcy and legal malpractice actions.  
Willis served Snyder with a deposition subpoena requiring him to produce the entire bankruptcy 
file and Snyder moved to quash. Willis argued the substance of plaintiff's confidential 
communications with counsel Snyder were relevant and "at issue" with respect to proximate 
 
118 192 Misc.2d at 611-612, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 576-577. 
 
119 191 F.R.D. 625 (D. Ka. 2000). 
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cause and that Snyder’s negligent conduct contributed to plaintiff’s damages.  Citing Rutgard 
and applying Hearn, the court concluded no waiver occurred: 
The fact that the communications may be "relevant," "at issue" or "substantially 
useful," however, is not sufficient to satisfy the standard articulated in Hearn, 68
F.R.D. at 581. According to Hearn, the confidential communications must be at 
issue as a result of an affirmative act by Plaintiff. . . Although there is no clear-
cut definition of "affirmative act" in the implied waiver context, asserting a claim 
of legal malpractice against former counsel has been construed to affirmatively 
place relevant attorney-client privileged communications at issue. . . . Some 
courts have extended the concept of implied waiver to relevant attorney-client 
privileged communications between a client and other retained counsel. See 
Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (Wash.1990) (recognizing 
the implied waiver concept in the context of a third-party malpractice claim 
against former client's other attorneys) (emphasis added.) See also, Rutgard v. 
Haynes, 185 F.R.D. 596, 599-600 (S.D.Cal.1999) (holding plaintiff waived 
attorney-client privilege between himself and subsequently retained attorney by 
putting "in issue" reasonableness of attorney's actions in recommending 
settlement.) Although the facts are different than those before the Court, the 
analysis used by the courts is instructive.120 (Some emphasis added). 
 
The Simmons Court found the issue presented similar to that in Pappas. In both cases, 
the discovery being sought dealt with the specific negligent act or omission originally alleged 
and the party bringing the negligence claim was the "catalyst" for introduction of a “comparative 
fault” defense.  Simmons alleged it was damaged as a result of Willis’ negligent conduct. Willis 
alleged it was Snyder who breached a duty to plaintiff that resulted in injury and damage, 
thereby raising the defense of comparative negligence.   
As in Pappas, the Simmons Court found Willis entitled to defend the negligence charge 
on proximate cause grounds, plaintiff having been the “catalyst” and having placing the disputed 
communications "at issue."  Citing Hearn, the Simmons Court held: (1) plaintiff “interposed” the 
privilege (by filing a negligence suit for damages); (2) plaintiff placed the protected information 
"at issue" (by making proximate cause relevant to the case); and (3) application of the privilege 
 
120 Id. at 635. 
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would deny Willis access to information vital to asserting a proximate cause defense to the 
negligence allegations.121 Thus, an implied waiver had occurred.122 
E. Conclusions 
Each of the above-discussed cases involved a careful examination of the complaint’s 
theory of causation and, also, each component of damages arising from defendant’s alleged acts.  
The courts permitted the malpractice defendant to discover communications relevant to 
the causation of all malpractice damages regardless of whether the attorney’s conduct occurred 
after an episode of malpractice by another attorney, if the court determined it might have given 
rise to a different malpractice-caused injury.  The temporal sequence of representations is, 
however, a critical element in such analysis, a point commentators have noted: 
[T]iming of the multiple counsel representation is essential to the determination of 
which privileged communications in possession of other attorneys are relevant to 
the defendant attorney's defense and, thus, subject to potential discovery. . . In 
order to determine which counsel possesses privileged communications that could 
be relevant to establishing a proximate cause, it is important to examine each 
lawyer's role in the underlying matter. . .  A few courts have distinguished 
between "subsequent" and "concurrent" representations. The relevant question is 
whether the lawyer sued for malpractice worked together with other counsel, and 
thus "concurrently" represented the client. Or, were the lawyers retained at 
different times, potentially even for different matters and therefore providing 
"subsequent" representations? The courts have properly held that if different 
counsel were retained subsequent to the other lawyer's alleged act of malpractice, 
there would be no issue of proximate causation as to who committed malpractice 
and, therefore, the privileged communications in subsequent lawyer's possession 
could not be helpful to the defense against malpractice. . . Accordingly, the courts 
have ruled that by suing a lawyer for malpractice a client does not automatically 
waive the privilege as to the subsequently retained counsel. . . However, if a team 
of lawyers represented a client concurrently, i.e. prior to any alleged malpractice 
acts, then the issue of proximate cause could arise, and thus the privileged 
documents could be essential to the defendant attorney's defense. . .  As a result, 
 
121 68 F.R.D. at  581. 
122 See also Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 756 A.2d 526 (Md. App. 2000)(relying on 
Hearn and Pappas, holding privilege not waived merely because client sues former counsel and that Hearn’s 
balancing test would be an appropriate tool to balance former client’s right to contribution against later counsel’s 
concern to protect the attorney-client privilege, on remand). 
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by suing his attorney for malpractice, the client waives the privilege against 
confidential communications in the concurrent counsel's possession relevant to 
the defendant lawyer's defense against malpractice.”) (notes omitted) (emphasis 
added).123 
Viewed broadly, courts are reluctant to permit defendants to exploit the implied waiver 
doctrine where they appear to be attempting to obtain a tactical advantage in the way they 
respond to a malpractice complaint.  They are less reluctant to find an implied waiver where any 
part of plaintiff’s malpractice damages may have been caused by an attorney’s representation,124 
even if that representation post-dated the events giving rise to damages or a component of 
damages.125 
123 See Lewinbuk, supra note 2 at 96-97  
 
124 Id.  See generally Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y.1976)(where a 
good faith basis existed for believing invasion of privilege would shed light on the validity of an estoppel argument 
precluding assertion of statutory protection, privilege waived).  But see U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 
1991)(where defendant sought a ruling allowing him to testify as to his belief in the lawfulness of his activities 
based on communications with his attorney, but to not be cross-examined on the subject, trial court found that if 
defendant testified regarding his good faith beliefs regarding the legality of his actions, he could be cross-examined 
as to the basis for his belief, including about his communications with attorney -- such testimony would have put his 
knowledge of the law in issue: “[a] defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to 
disclose some selected communications for self-serving purposes. Thus, the privilege may implicitly be waived 
when defendant asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.”). 
 
125 In Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. IAG Intern. Acceptance Group, N.V., 1997 WL 272405 (S.D.N.Y. May 
21, 1997), the court relied on Hearn, Jakobleff, and Bilzerian, in analyzing plaintiff’s assertion of a good faith 
defense to counterclaims which defendant argued resulted in a waiver of privilege co-extensive with the counter-
claims as to which good faith was asserted. 1997 WL 272405, at * 5. It concluded plaintiff’s reasons for filing suit, 
obtaining an attachment and consenting to its vacatur were relevant and that privileged documents or other 
communications that would tend to bear on those subjects had to be disclosed.  It rejected plaintiff’s efforts to 
temporally limit the extent of waiver, requiring production of all relevant materials.  Id  See Goetz v. Volpe, 11 
Misc.3d 632, 635-636, 812 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296-297 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2006.)(where the third-party malpractice 
defendant law firm's “’representation overlaps and is simultaneous to another firm's representation of that client in 
the same matter, New York courts have found the client's communications with the non-defendant law firm lose its 
privilege as to the defendant law firm’”) (citation omitted). 
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IV. Academic and Case Criticism of Hearn
A. Academic Criticism of the Hearn Test of Implied Waiver  
The Hearn Test has been the subject of substantial academic criticism.126 Because the 
attorney client privilege is an “absolute” privilege, commentators have argued that  any rule 
which finds an implied waiver based on the “need” for information or “fairness” considerations 
is anathema.  One of the most frequently cited academic criticisms of Hearn is set forth in a 1985 
Harvard Law Review article Developments in the Law--Privileged Communication.127 
Discussing the implied waiver doctrine, the authors write: 
The Hearn test includes three criteria for the application of a placing-at-issue- 
waiver: the privilege-holder must, (1) through some affirmative act, make an 
assertion that (2) renders relevant to the action (3) privileged matter that is vital 
to the opposing party’s defense. . . Only the third element of this three-step test 
limits the application of the rule of waiver.  The first and second elements do 
little to limit the application of the waiver because every affirmative pleading 
will make new material relevant to the action. But the third element’s focus on 
the opposing party’s need for the privileged information is inappropriate to the 
waiver of absolute, as distinguished from qualified, privileges.  Absolute 
privileges, such as the attorney-client…privileges, should not depend upon case-
by-case balancing of the harm to the relationship against an opposing litigant’s 
need for the information.  These privileges have been instituted on the basis of a 
system-wide balancing of costs and benefits.  Once all the technical requirements 
of a privilege have been met, courts should not impose their own sense of the 
equities, because trial judges may tend to give decisive weight to the needs of the 
parties before them, without adequately considering the full, system-side benefits 
of a privilege.128 (Emphasis added). 
 
126 So, too, has the scope of the attorney client privilege, generally.  See Nix, supra note 21 at 286 (exact scope 
of attorney-client privilege has  recently become the focus of heated scholarly debate)   
 
127 98 Harv. L .Rev. 1450 (1985)(first cited supra note 1). 
 
128 Id. at 1640 (notes omitted).  See also Nix, supra note 21 at  290-292 ("utilitarian" justification assumes 
privilege is vital to encouraging full and frank communication between attorneys and clients and that clients will be 
more amenable to open discussion if they are assured conversation will not be subject to disclosure -- the lawyer will 
more likely obtain information necessary to properly defend or promote the client's case, allowing the adversarial 
system of justice to function more effectively – exclusion of otherwise obtainable evidence is justified because 
system as a whole benefits); David A. Nelson, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural Safeguards: Are 
They Worth the Costs?, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 368, 384 n.127 (1992) (“While the privilege may suppress important 
evidence, it has been determined that the need to allow the attorney to provide sound legal advice generally . . . 
outweighs any disadvantage of withholding evidence in a particular case.”)(notes omitted).   
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A case-by-case balancing test should be considered particularly inappropriate 
with respect to the attorney-client privilege, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on the role of certainty in “encourag[ing] full and frank 
communications between attorneys and their clients.”  A rule of waiver that turns 
on the opponent’s need for information would subject the privilege to the 
hazards of fortune: the continued existence of one’s privilege would depend not 
on how one has used or abused the privilege, but rather on who one’s adversary 
happens to be.  One adversary might have ample access to information while 
another would not.129 (Emphasis added). 
 
“Absolute privileges,”  say the authors, are “privileges that can be nullified only by the 
privilege holder’s waiver,” whereas “qualified privileges” can be revoked “whenever the 
circumstances of the case are such that the need for the information outweighs the harm that 
disclosure would cause to the protected relationship.”130 Defined in this way, Hearn fails a
priori; need-based or fairness based nullification of privilege are eliminated by definition.   
The commentators oppose allowing anyone (other than the privilege holder) or any 
system to determine when privilege is waived:  “Unlike the doctrine of express waiver, which 
allocates control of the privilege between the parties to the communication, the doctrine of 
implied waiver allocates control of the privilege between the judicial system and the party 
holding the privilege.”131 Because absolute privileges reflect a system-wide balancing of costs 
and benefits, but case by case balancing involves judges imposing their own sense of the 
equities, outcomes will not result from system-wide considerations, but individual needs of 
litigants, as seem fair to judges.132 
129 Developments, supra note 1 at 1641 (notes omitted).  See also Nix, supra note 21 at 315 (information loss 
argument ignores one of the strongest justifications for the privilege, that  “the costs resulting from the loss of 
relevant facts in court are justified by the societal interest in encouraging clients to be candid with their attorneys.”).  
 
130 Id. at 1640, n.51. 
 
131 Id.  at   1630. 
132 See Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (privilege promotes free exchange of information which 
promotes broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice; sound legal advice or 
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B. Case Criticism of the Hearn Test 
A minority of courts have rejected the Hearn Test concluding it has been applied in a 
confusing and inconsistent manner,133 criticizing its post-hoc reliance on “hazy concepts” of 
what appears to be “relevant” or “fair,” and, generally, urging, like the commentators in 
Developments, that the problems discussed in Section IV undermine the protections afforded by 
the American legal system as a whole.   
In Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Ins.,134 for example, the Third 
Circuit held that attorney advice is not put “in issue” merely because it is “relevant“ or might 
affect the client's state of mind.135 Only the client can put counsel’s advice in issue when he 
asserts a claim or defense and then attempts to prove it by disclosing an attorney client 
communication.136 Having the client take affirmative steps to waive the privilege, it reasoned, 
 
advocacy serves public ends and depends on the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client – intent of the privilege 
is full disclosure); In re Circle K Corp., 1996 WL 529399, *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (no waiver where issue was 
plaintiffs' knowledge of the facts, not the law, and defendants could find out same in discovery, refusing to permit 
privilege to be circumvented merely because the communications might shed light on issue, citing Rhone for the 
proposition that relevance is not the standard for determining whether evidence should be protected from 
disclosure); Union Carbide v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del. 1985) (need to permit attorney to 
provide sound legal advice generally outweighs any disadvantage of withholding evidence in particular cases); In re 
Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (fullest disclosure enables attorneys to act more “effectively, justly, and 
expeditiously"' (quoting 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Evidence § 503(02) (1982))); U.S. v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ("'[t]he social good derived from the proper performance 
of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the 
suppression of the evidence in specific cases"' (quoting Model Code of Evidence Rule 210 cmt. (1942))). 
 
133 See, e.g., Service Company of New Mexico v. Lyons, 129 N.M. 487, 493-494, 10 P.3d 166, 172-173 (New 
Mexico App. 2000)(Hearn has been applied in a “confusing and uneven manner” leading to criticism, citing cases 
and academic criticism, especially, Developments, supra note 1 at 1639-43 (Hearn’s third prong, that information be 
vital, only prong with limiting force, but need for information anathema to concept of absolute privilege -- Hearn's 
case-by-case balancing contrary to need for certainty, arguing Hearn fails to target a type of unfairness 
distinguishable from the unfairness generated by every assertion of privilege and its application cannot be rationally 
limited). 
134 32 F.3d 851, 863-864 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
135 Id. at 863.   
 
136 Id. (citing North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 370 (D.N.J. 1992); 
Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 71 (D.N.J. 1992)). See Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala 
Holdings (U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(Grubin, Mag. J.)(implied waiver renders privilege "a 
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engenders predictability while encouraging clients to consult counsel – “free from the 
apprehension that the communications will be disclosed without their consent.”137 No waiver, it 
held, should occur merely because a client's state of mind might be an issue: 
Some decisions have extended the finding of waiver of the privilege to cases in 
which the client’s state of mind may be in issue in the litigation. . . These 
decisions [Hearn and others] are of dubious validity. While the opinions dress up 
their analysis with a checklist of factors, they appear to rest on a conclusion that 
the information sought is relevant and should in fairness be disclosed. Relevance 
is not the standard for determining whether or not evidence should be protected 
from disclosure as privileged, and that remains the case even if one might 
conclude the facts to be disclosed are vital, highly probative, directly relevant or 
even go to the heart of an issue. As the attorney client privilege is intended to 
assure a client that he or she can consult with counsel in confidence, finding that 
confidentiality may be waived depending on the relevance of the communication 
completely undermines the interest to be served. Clients will face the greatest risk 
of disclosure for what may be the most important matters. Furthermore, because 
the definition of what may be relevant and discoverable from those consultations 
may depend on the facts and circumstances of as yet unfiled litigation, the client 
will have no sense of whether the communication may be relevant to some future 
issue, and will have no sense of certainty or assurance that the communication 
will remain confidential. . . While the attorney's advice may be relevant to the 
matters in issue, the privilege applies as the interests it is intended to protect are 
still served by confidentiality.138 (Emphasis added). 
 
Restated, making waiver depend on concepts like “relevance” or “essential need,”  
undermines privilege’s purpose to assure optimal encouragement of open and unconstrained 
 
nullity in all the vast commercial litigation in which fraud or reliance is an issue," but that the defendant still must 
"disclose its thoughts and knowledge, whether or not acquired from conversations with its attorneys"); Paramount 
Comm., Inc. v. Donaghy, 858 F.Supp. 391, 395 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (Sweet, J.) (waiver should properly be found only 
when "the attorney-client relationship was relied upon, in some fashion, affirmatively to support the asserting party's 
claims, or the[re] was evidence that the attorneys themselves independently took actions or made decisions relevant 
to the case"); Laborers Local 17 Health Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4550, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
11156, at *15 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1998) (Dolinger, Mag. J.) (assertion of a fraud theory or other legal claim 
implicating plaintiff's knowledge insufficient to trigger a broad waiver of the plaintiff's attorney-client privilege" but 
the facts known by the plaintiff's trustees may be discovered even if they first learned from counsel) 
 
137 32 F.3d at 863-864. 
138 32 F.3d at 864. Cases and commentators have criticized Hearn on the basis of Rhone’s analysis See, e.g., 
Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp., 2002 WL 1728566, *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2003)(noting criticism of Hearn 
Test, citing Rhone); Golowski II and Rainone, supra note 27 at 3 (discussing Rhone’s conclusion that Hearn’s 
progeny is of "dubious" validity, noting recent expansion of implied waiver has resulted from failure to heed 
Rhone’s criticisms). 
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attorney-client communication.139 Requiring an affirmative act of waiver, places the decision to 
waive privilege in the hands of the client, encouraging and protecting free communication.140 
The position taken in Rhone contrasts positions taken by other courts.141 
In Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons,142 another leading case criticizing the Hearn 
Test and citing Rhone, the court determined that the law of implied waiver was being applied in a 
confusing and uneven manner:143 
139 Courts routinely distinguish bare relevance and essential need. See, e.g., TIG Ins. Co. v. Yules & Yules, 
1999 WL 1029712 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1999) (although disclosure of plaintiff's communications with subsequent 
counsel would be helpful in demonstrating plaintiff (or successor counsel) acted unreasonably in not pressing 
stronger arguments against limitations defense in subrogation action, defendants could make same arguments based 
on the facts of the subrogation case, without breaching the privilege). In Raphael v. Clune White & Nelson, 146 
A.D.2d 762, 537 N.Y.S.2d 246  (2d Dep’t 1989), plaintiff sued former counsel for malpractice in handling his New 
York-filed injury action, which was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, and recommenced suit in England, 
using English counsel, settled, and then sued in New York, claiming he had to accept a "grossly inadequate" 
settlement in England because of his "destitute financial condition," caused by former counsel’s improper 
commencement of the action in the wrong forum.  Defendants sought correspondence between plaintiff and the 
English attorneys, arguing the correspondence was placed “in issue” by plaintiff’s allegation that he settled because 
defendants caused his "destitute" condition” – the court held that no disclosure was required because defendants did 
not need to pierce the privilege to assert defenses. 146 A.D.2d at 763, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 246.   
 
140 Rhone has been limited to its facts.  See generally Harding v. Dana Transport, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1084, 
1096 (D.N.J. 1996)(defendants’ reliance on Rhone was misplaced, noting subsequent authority limited that case to 
the “unique facts,” that Rhone did not involve advice of counsel being raised as an affirmative defense, nor were 
there any acts evincing a clear intent to waive the attorney-client privilege by placing at issue reliance on the advice 
of counsel); See also WLIG-TV, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 229, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994)(distinguishing Rhone, describing it as a “garden variety” case in which only the knowledge of a party was at 
issue, and observing that something more than “mere relevance” is at stake when a plaintiff seeks to overcome a 
limitation bar by interjecting equitable doctrines, noting the Second Circuit follows Hearn, and reasoning that 
because WLIG  raised equitable doctrines to avoid a limitations defense, it impliedly waived privilege). 
141 See generally Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, 1997 WL 773716, *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997)(“[T]o the 
extent that Hearn, as interpreted by Rhone-Poulenc, stands for the proposition that the mere act of placing a party's 
state of mind at issue supports a finding of waiver, the law in this circuit does not support such a result. . . On the 
other hand, to the extent that Rhone-Poulenc requires a party to overtly and explicitly rely upon the advice of 
counsel in order to trigger Hearn, the law in this circuit does not support such a result.  . . . Rather, between these 
extreme positions of mere assertion and overt reliance, Hearn is triggered " 'even if the privilege holder does not 
attempt to make use of the privileged information. . . the privilege [may be waived] if [the privilege holder] makes 
factual assertions the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of the privileged communication.' " 
Liberty, 1997 WL 471053, at *3 (quoting In re Kidder Peabody Secs. Litig., 168 F.R.D. at 470. . . a finding of 
waiver . . . would require a finding of waiver in virtually every litigation, for in almost all actions a party either 
"affirmatively place [[s] its knowledge or intent at issue" or "rel[ies] upon ... statues" and thereby puts "its 
obligations under the law directly in issue." As set forth above, the law in this circuit requires something more; 
namely, that a party make " 'factual assertions the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of the 
privileged communication.' "”. . .) (citations omitted)).   
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Perhaps the strongest academic criticism is found in . . . [Developments] . . . The 
law review  strongly proposes that the opposing party's need for the information is 
anathema to the concept of an absolute privilege. The article is also critical 
because Hearn 's case-by-case balancing approach runs counter to the United 
States Supreme Court's emphasis on the need for certainty. Id. We consider 
noteworthy the following summation of criticism in the article: "the faults in the 
Hearn approach are (1) that it does not succeed in targeting a type of unfairness 
that is distinguishable from the unavoidable unfairness generated by every 
assertion of privilege and (2) that its application cannot be limited." Id.; see also 
Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. 
L.Rev. 1605, 1632-33 (1986) (waiver should only be recognized where party has 
attempted to garble the truth by injecting privileged material itself into the 
case).144 
The Public Service Court relied on Rhone:
We agree with the reservations forcefully discussed in Rhone. It follows from the 
rationale found in Rhone and the academic criticism of the Hearn approach that 
the third approach discussed by the Tenth Circuit in Frontier Refining merits 
serious consideration. That approach is to recognize waiver only where a party 
"seeks to limit its liability by describing that advice and by asserting that he relied 
on that advice." Rhone 32 F.3d at 863. The Rhone approach, which also 
recognizes waiver where direct use is anticipated because the holder of the 
privilege must use the materials at some point in order to prevail, is followed by a 
minority of courts. . . . We therefore side with the minority of jurisdictions that 
require offensive or direct use of privileged materials before the party will be 
deemed to have waived its attorney-client privileges. . . Our rules reflect a careful, 
methodical, approach to the development of the rules governing privileges – one 
that involves public participation and discourages ad hoc judicial intervention. . .  
application of the Hearn-type test would undermine the "full and frank" 
communications at the heart of the attorney-client privilege and would be contrary 
to the certainty that the rules themselves are intended to provide.145 
The Court concluded that the approach it was adopting would accurately reflect 
the often-used sword/shield metaphor: 
 
142 129 N.M. 487, 10 P.3d 166 (Ct. App. Mexico 2000). 
 
143 10 P.2d at 172  (citing West Point-Pepperell, 848 F.Supp. at 429 ("Expansive interpretation of 'at issue' 
waiver under Hearn and its progeny has recently been the subject of significant legal and academic criticism."). 
 
144 10 P.2d at 172. 
145 Id. at  173.  
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The restrictive approach we adopt is consistent with the long-held view that the 
attorney-client privilege should act as a shield and not a sword. Confusion in the 
"at-issue" case law arises because some courts believe that parties are using a 
privilege as a sword when they refuse to disclose matters relevant to issues or 
claims that they have injected into the litigation. This belief explains why the 
Hearn ad hoc balancing test has resulted in an expansive use of waiver. By 
adopting the Rhone approach requiring offensive or direct use of privileged 
information, we believe the 'shield/sword' metaphor is more accurately applied.146 
Public Service has also been the subject of substantial case discussion, as well as 
commentary, with respect to its reliance on Rhone.147 
In Allen v. West Point-Pepperell,148 another often cited case, the court criticized Hearn 
and implied waiver for generating ad hoc determinations,149 undermining privileges while 
increasing litigation costs,150 and generating conflicting case outcomes.151 
146 Id. at  173-174.  See also Shargel v. U.S., 742 F.2d 61, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (theory underlying the 
privilege is that by encouraging clients to make the fullest disclosure, attorneys will more effectively and justly 
represent clients with the benefits outweighing the risks posed by revelation of communications in court, noting 
privilege spares attorneys the need to make “Hobson’s choices,” protecting the system of justice). 
 
147 See, e.g., Lama v. Preskill, 353 Ill.App.3d 300, 309-310, 818 N.E.2d 443, 452, 288 Ill.Dec.755, 764 Ill.App 
2004)((Bowman, J. dissenting)(citing criticism of Hearn, including Rhone, Public Service, and Developments,
agreeing that “relevance” is not the standard for determining whether evidence should is protected, even if the facts 
at issue go to the heart of an issue, and arguing Hearn Test should not be adopted). 
 
148 848 F.Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y.  1994). 
149 Allen, 848 F. Supp. at 428 (“Expansive interpretation of ‘at issue’ waiver under Hearn and its progeny has 
recently been the subject of significant legal and academic criticism. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311-12 (N.D.Cal.1987) (stating that expansive language for determining implied waiver 
leads to ad hoc determinations that ignore the system-wide role of the attorney-client privilege and undermines the 
confidence that parties can place in that privilege); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 
(Fed.Cir.1985) (party does not waive privilege merely by bringing suit).”).   
 
150 See Allen, 848 F. Supp. at  429 (citing “Marcus, The Perils of the privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 
Mich.L.Rev. 1605 (1986) (liberal implied waiver rules increase litigation costs and judicial time spent on discovery 
disputes, favor the wealthiest litigants, and undermine the values served by the privilege rules); Developments-
Privileged Communications, 98 Harv.L.Rev. 1450, 1637-43 (1985) (identifying the same policy concerns); 
Remington Arms, supra, at 142 F.R.D. 412-414 (noting inconsistency in courts' application of implied waiver tests 
derived from Hearn due to competing policy concerns relating to the attorney-client privilege).”). 
 
151 Allen, 848 F. Supp. at  429.  
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C. Responses to Academic and Case Criticism of Hearn 
Summarizing, Hearn critics first argue that case by case determinations of privilege 
under a test relying on “fairness,” “relevance” or “need” leads to ad hoc results, case confusion, 
and the undermining of certainty and predictability, raising litigation costs. Second, they argue 
current law fosters manipulation by plaintiff, defendant, or both, particularly with respect to the 
question of which party places the communication “at issue.”152 Third, hind-sight 
determinations under the Hearn Test undermine full and honest communication, the basis of our 
legal system.153 
First,  with respect to the argument that a test relying on concepts of  “fairness,” 
“relevance” or “need” leads to ad hoc results, case confusion, and the undermining of certainty 
and predictability, it is unclear that case “confusion” is traceable to any of these concepts.  In the 
legal malpractice context, for example, it is likely that the factual complexity of cases in which 
attorneys participate in inter-locking and overlapping representations creates analytical 
difficulties.  The problems result not from judicial efforts to determine what is “fair” in a 
emotional sense, as critics suggest, but from courts’ careful efforts to determine which conduct 
(and which attorney) is responsible for plaintiff’s alleged injuries.  Although the term “fairness” 
suggests some sort of non-specific, emotive and visceral response by courts, as the legal 
 
152 See generally Developments, supra note 1 at 1632 (“Most assertions of an evidentiary privilege are 
‘strategic’ in the sense that the asserting party considers how using the privilege may affect his lawsuit. . . implied 
waiver has been used to prevent the sort of strategic manipulation of privileges that enables privilege-holders to 
obtain advantages never considered part of the legitimate costs of a system of privilege.”). 
 
153 See generally Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, 1997 WL 773716, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) (“precise 
limits of the Hearn doctrine continue to perplex both courts and commentators. . .  As a number of courts have 
recognized, Hearn is problematic insofar as there are very few instances in which the Hearn factors, taken at face 
value, do not apply and, therefore, a large majority of claims of privilege would be subject to waiver, citing  Rhone 
and Allen); See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 2003 WL 21277139, *2 (S.D.N.Y.  June 
2, 2003) (same). 
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malpractice cases show, courts are really just doing what they always do – assess who caused the 
damage, whether the conduct or omission constitutes a legal wrong and how injury may be 
quantified.  In practice,  therefore, “fairness” is just legal short-hand for the ordinary analytical 
concepts of causation and reliance, used every day by courts and counsel.  
Although critics urge that outcomes of privilege determinations are “ad hoc,” there is 
considerably more going on than a coin toss.  Court analyses are not a function of whim, but of 
efforts to understand the precise claims being made, the importance of the communication as a 
means of proving the claim, and the likelihood such communication or information might be 
produced from other sources. 
The Arizona Supreme Court has explained why it believes the interpretation of privilege 
embodied in Rhone (and its rejection of the Hearn Test) is problematic: 
Rhone-Poulenc held that there is an implied waiver only if the party expressly 
advances the defense that he relied on advice of counsel; it rejects cases such as 
League and Hearn as "of dubious validity" because of their use of a "checklist of 
factors" and the fairness test. Id. at 863- 64. It is, of course, late in Arizona's day 
to reject WIGMORE's fairness test, which we first adopted almost forty years ago 
in Throop, which is incorporated in the Hearn doctrine and which Arizona has 
consistently applied in our cases since Throop. It is that doctrine that the trial 
judge, having been cited to Hearn, followed and applied in the present case. Nor 
do we believe we would adopt the restrictive test of . . . Rhone-Poulenc even if 
today we were writing on a clean slate. It simply makes a mockery of the law to 
allow a litigant to claim on the one hand that it acted reasonably because it made 
a legal evaluation from which it concluded that the law permitted it to act in a 
certain manner, while at the same time allowing that litigant to withhold from its 
adversary and the factfinder information it received from counsel on that very 
subject and that therefore was included in its evaluation. The sword and shield 
metaphor would truly apply were we to allow a party to raise the privilege in that 
situation. (Emphasis added).154 
Public Service, too, has been the subject of substantial case criticism, focusing on its use 
of the “sword and shield” metaphor, and reliance on Rhone:
154 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 199 Ariz. 53,  64-65, 13 P.3d 1169, 1181-1182 (Ariz. 2000). 
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The [Public Service] court does not say how the [sword and shield] metaphor is 
more accurately applied, but rather goes on to discuss again the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege. Indeed, how the metaphor may thus be more accurately 
applied is unclear. Suppose, as in the statute of limitations example, the plaintiff 
pleads equitable tolling and declines to reveal how he failed to discover the basis 
for his claim. The defendant might now, through interrogatory, ask how the 
plaintiff failed to discover the basis for his claim. Presumably, the plaintiff may 
decline to answer the interrogatory, citing the attorney-client privilege. The 
defendant has hit a dead end. The Rhone-Poulenc approach has not given the 
plaintiff a metaphorical shield, as suggested by Lyons, nor is one needed, because 
the Rhone-Poulenc approach has deprived the defendant of a sword.”155 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Second, although litigants will obviously attempt to manipulate privileges and waiver 
rules, as they do every rule,  there is nothing inherent in the concepts of “fairness” or “relevance” 
which should cause courts to eschew their use.156 Plaintiffs, in fashioning their damage claims 
can, of course, be viewed as “manipulating” later privilege determinations, just as defendants, in 
pleading affirmative defenses, can also be viewed as “manipulating.”157 A rule which precludes 
“manipulation” by refusing to tolerate implied waiver, however, purchases non-manipulation at 
the cost of unfair outcomes, a cost which, on a systemic basis, may be too high.158 
155 Moore, supra note 23 at 636 (2001)(although the Public Service Court strongly protected use and purpose 
of the privilege and, thereby, promoting competent legal counsel for individuals and society's interest in such 
counsel, it simultaneously created the opportunity for parties to unfairly use the privilege, as a weapon). 
 
156 These concepts do not foster manipulation any more than a rule relying on “abuse” of the privilege -- 
“abuse” is, itself, an inherently normative concept. 
 
157 In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C.Cir. 1982)(“Where society has subordinated its interest in the 
search for truth in favor of allowing certain information to remain confidential, it need not allow that confidentiality 
to be used as a tool for manipulation of the truth-seeking process.”). 
 
158 In Developments, the commentators argue judicial consideration of “how one has used or abused the 
privilege” should be the determining factor in privilege analysis. See Developments, supra note 1 at 1630-1631. 
However, there is no reason to be believe that judicial determination of how a privilege has been “abused” would be 
less idiosyncratic and less based on “fairness” considerations than one based on need for information.    One of the 
policies underlying the implied waiver rule is avoidance of the manipulation of privileges by privilege holders: 
“’Fairness’ becomes an important concern during litigation when one party would suffer prejudice from his 
opponent’s abuse of the privilege. Most commonly, such prejudice occurs in three types of situations: (1) the 
strategic introduction into evidence of only part of a larger class of privileged material, which will be termed “partial 
disclosure,” (2) the strategic timing of the decision to rely upon privileged evidence, as in pre-trial disclosure, and 
(3) the pleading of claims that place at issue the subject matter of privileged communications.   In response to such 
49
Which rule is to be preferred, therefore – a rule which permits judges to consider need-
based considerations, which allows litigants to obtain information vital to the search for truth but 
permits the privilege to be invaded, in at least some cases, or a rule that, arguendo, fosters more 
(and more candid) communication between counsel and client,159 but precludes disclosure of 
information, even where it is vital to fair outcomes, and unavailable from other sources?    
Hearn Test critics have argued that the privilege must be preserved, even if the search for 
truth suffers: 
Without such stability concerning to the privilege, how could an attorney and a 
client be able to predict, years later, whether their communications intended  to 
remain privileged -- might be deemed by a later court to be "relevant" or "vital" 
regarding subsequent litigation. We believe the Hearn approach places this 
venerable privilege in harm's way, something we cannot countenance, and even at 
the expense of a zealous pursuit of truth.160 
Why should absolute protection of the attorney client privilege supercede the zealous 
pursuit of truth?  What are the systemic benefits that attend absolute protection of the privilege 
and how are such benefits to be weighed against the cost of unfair litigation outcomes? 
 
strategic manipulation of privileges, courts have invoked the doctrine waiver to ensure the full an timely disclosure 
of any communications that one party seeks to use against the other.” Id.
159 Developments, supra note 1 at  1473 (“Wigmore, as well as most courts and commentators, considers only 
systemic harms in the balancing test established by the fourth condition  [‘The injury that would inure to the relation 
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation’ Id. at 1472]. . . [T]he traditional justification ignores specific injury to those actually before the court; the 
protection of any particular relationship or the preservation of any particular confidence is not valued as an end in 
itself. Instead, proponents of this rationale evaluate privileges solely by weighing the benefits of their 
encouragement of privileges solely by weighing the benefits of their encouragement of communications within the 
relevant class of relation against the cost of the obstruction to truth-seeking.” (notes omitted)). 
 
160 Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons, 129 N.M. 487, 494-95, 10 P.2d 166, 173-74 (New Mexico 
App. 2000). 
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V. The American Legal System,  the Search for Truth and Implied Waiver
A. Is the Goal of the Adversarial System Really  a “Search for Truth” 
Permitting defendants accused of wrongdoing to access information vital to the 
vindication of their rights is a crucial component of the America legal system.161 Whether in the 
context of the government’s efforts to deprive a defendant of liberty or civil plaintiff’s efforts to 
deprive a defendant of property, every defendant’s rights are protected by a system whose 
ultimate goal is to reasonably determine whether the case against the defendant has been proven.  
Our adversarial system aims to determine what occurred, or, at least what the fact-finder has 
reasonable grounds to believe occurred, through a fair adjudication of evidence.   
The truth-finding function of the legal system has been repeatedly identified as its 
primary purpose.  In U.S. v. Nixon,162 in the criminal context, Chief Justice Burger explained: 
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental 
and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments 
were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.  The very 
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full 
disclosure of all the facts, within the frame work of the rules of evidence. . . 
exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor 
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. . . . the 
allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a 
criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and 
gravely impair the basic function of the courts.163 
161 See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 77, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1129 (2000) (Ginzberg, J. and Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“A trial ideally is a search for the truth”). 
162 U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,  94 S.Ct. 3090 (1974) (Burger, C.J.). 
 
163 418 U.S. at  709-713,  94 S.Ct. at 3108-3110 (“we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper 
the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such 
conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution”).  See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19-
20, 116 S.Ct. 1932, 1996 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (majority ignores traditional judicial preference 
for the truth, suggesting assumption that a person would actually be deterred from seeking psychological counseling 
(or from being completely truthful in the course of such counseling), because of fear of later disclosure of same in a 
litigation, is ill-founded, but not citing empirical studies).   
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Truth is a paramount objective of our legal system.164 Justices O’Conner, Scalia and 
Thomas, in an often cited dissent in Swidler & Berlin v. U.S.,165 observed: 
Given that the complete exclusion of relevant evidence from a criminal trial or 
investigation may distort the record, mislead the factfinder, and undermine the 
central truth-seeking function of the courts. . . When the privilege is asserted in 
the criminal context, and a showing is made that the communications at issue 
contain necessary factual information not otherwise available, courts should be 
permitted to assess whether interests in fairness and accuracy outweigh the 
justifications for the privilege.”) (Emphasis added).166 
Other well known academics and practitioners, arguing to the contrary, have questioned 
whether the law is a search for truth at all.  Professor Alan Dershowitz, in his book on the O.J. 
Simpson trial, for example, writes: 
[A] criminal trial is anything but a pure search for truth.  When defense attorneys 
represent guilty clients – as most do, most of the time – their responsibility is to 
try, by all fair and ethical means, to prevent the truth about their client’s guilt 
from emerging.167 
Professor Dershowitz’s colleague on the O.J. Simpson case, the late Johnnie Cochran,  
had this to say about the search for truth: 
 
164 See Dean Kenneth W. Starr, Truth and Truth-Telling, 30 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 901, 903-904 (1999)(“ Most of 
our rules of procedure, our rules of evidence, even many of our rules of substantive law are designed to facilitate the 
search for truth. . . Testimonial privileges constitute the only exception to this rule – and it is a limited exception. . . 
We tolerate such impediments to truth-seeking only in exceptionally important circumstances. . . And the courts 
invariably construe and apply these privileges strictly, for they operate, in the Supreme Court’s phrase, in derogation 
of the truth. . . Privileges, then, are a significant but tightly cabined exception to the norm that our system seeks the 
truth. . . Truth is simply indispensable to the fair and impartial administration of justice.”).  See also Akhil Reed 
Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Violations), 20 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y,  457, 
466 (1997)(“When truth is excluded from trials, there will be two types of systemic errors: wrongful, erroneous 
convictions and erroneous acquittals. The rules hurt innocent defendants while helping the guilty ones. And I have a 
hard time explaining to my mother or my brother why that makes sense.”). 
 
165 524 U.S. 399, 413-414 (1998). 
 
166 Id.
167 Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts: The O.J. Simpson Case and the Criminal Justice System 166 
(1996), quoted in W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: 
Misdirection, Lying, and “Lying with an Explanation,” 44  S. Tx. L. Rev. 53, 79 n.13 (2002).  See generally David 
J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and 
Frauds, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 443,  n.269 (1986)(“The premise that the purpose of a trial is to discovery the ‘truth’ is 
highly questionable. . . “). 
52
A trial really isn’t so much the search for truth. The great Clarence Darrow . . . 
once said that a courtroom is not a place where truth and innocence inevitably 
triumph.  It is only an arena where contending lawyers fight not for justice, but to 
win.168 
The issue, however, is not what the defense attorney is doing to best represent his client, 
including trying to obscure the truth;  it is what end(s) the system seeks even with defense 
counsel, within the rules, attempting to suggest the prosecuting party has not met its burden.   
Waiver critics argue even if there might be individual instances of unfairness as a result 
of a truly absolute attorney client privilege, adjudicative mechanisms and/or the system as a 
whole, would be made better due to increased, more candid client-counsel communication.169 
Therefore, they argue, our system of justice would be a better one, by virtue of an absolute 
privilege.170 The arguments are largely a priori.
Few serious empirical studies have been conducted to try to determine if they are actually 
correct but those that have been conducted do not support elimination of the implied waiver 
doctrine. 
 
168 Akhil Reed Amar and Johnie L. Cochran, Jr., Do Criminal Defendants have too Many Rights?, 33 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1193, 1203 (1996) (statements of Johnie Cochran). 
169 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18  (“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a 
trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the . . . [client's] interest in privacy and the evidentiary 
need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. . .” noting that  if the purpose of the privilege 
is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict with some degree of 
certainty whether particular discussion will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain 
but results in widely varying application by the courts , is little better than no privilege at all. . . . ’ (Citation 
omitted)(dealing with psychologist/patient privilege); In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(Tatel, J. dissenting) (balancing test makes application of privilege contingent on a judge's later finding that the 
evidentiary need for disclosure outweighs the interests of the client, arguing clients will be less forthcoming in their 
communications with their counsel because they will not know whether such communications will be protected). 
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B. Empirical Evidence and the Policies Supporting Attorney Client Privilege 
Preliminarily, commentators have long decried the dearth of empirical studies addressing 
the attorney client privilege, particularly given the enthusiastic support apologists for competing 
interpretations have demonstrated: 
Eminent commentators thus have called for empirical research testing the benefits 
of strict confidentiality and the validity of its justifications. . .  The academic 
community has, however, uniformly ignored the call. The scholarly inaction 
stems, perhaps, from a 'feeling' that the issues are more theoretical than real. . . 
Academia's refusal to question and test the operation of the rules in those cases is 
shortsighted. At a minimum, it makes the bar look bad. . . In contrast, basing rules 
or exceptions on empirically provable contentions can forestall the public 
perception that ethical regulations merely protect the guild.171 
To similar effect: 
[S]cholars have also noted the lack of empirical evidence establishing its practical 
effectiveness. . .  Yet no new studies have been conducted in response. Most 
commentators continue simply to assert the essential nature of strict 
confidentiality to our legal system. . .  Perhaps implicit in the persistent reliance 
on intuition instead of hard data is the notion that factual information is difficult 
to interpret.172 
Empirical studies do not suggest a system without an implied waiver doctrine would be 
better than one with such a rule, a point some Hearn critics concede.173 Hearn critics concede 
 
170 See Zacharias, supra note 5 at 358 (noting that pro-absolute privilege apologists argue that by encouraging 
clients to communicate information they would otherwise withhold from their lawyers, confidentiality enhances the 
quality of legal representation and thus helps produce accurate legal verdicts). 
 
171 Zacharias, supra note 5 at 353-354 (“[T]he tradition of strict confidentiality has helped teach lawyers and 
clients to rationalize amoral representation. Lawyers must close their eyes to information that might prevent harm to 
others or that violates the lawyers' own ethical and political beliefs. Rules encouraging this persona inevitably affect 
lawyers' individuality and desire to consider ethics in other aspects of their practice.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.. An 
Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, 1062 (1978)(privilege employed more 
to veil wrongdoing than serve policy of open communication).    
 
172 Zacharias, supra note 5 at 376; Alexander, supra note 5 at 197 (“Most literature relating to the attorney-
client privilege in the corporate context has been limited to doctrinal analysis.”). 
 
173 See Zacharias, supra note 5 at 353-354. See also id. at 364-366 (empirical evidence suggests clients would 
not use lawyers significantly less if more exceptions to absolute confidentiality existed; clients would not disclose 
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that their argument’s central premise, that clients will not use attorneys unless they know there is 
[an absolute] privilege or that clients will be substantially less honest in speaking with their 
attorneys if they believe their communications may be discovered in a future litigation, is not 
strongly supported by empirical surveys.  In Developments, for example, the authors state “scant 
empirical evidence” supports the position that disallowing implied waivers encourages 
communication, but they argue critics of an absolute interpretation of privilege cannot do much 
better -- “no solid empirical data exists to support the estimates of either critics or proponents as 
to either costs or benefits of privileges.”174 The authors then cite commentary questioning 
whether any data could be obtained that would justify privileges under utilitarian or “privacy” 
theories, suggesting privileges are unexplainable under either theory.175 
The empirical data, however, is less equivocal than Developments suggest. 
In a study published by the Yale Law Journal in 1962 (the “Yale Study”),176 the study’s 
authors received responses to questionnaires of 108 laypersons, solicited from various  parts of 
the eastern half of the country, and 50 attorneys, practicing in Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, New 
Haven, and New York, chosen at random through Martindale Hubbell Law Directory.177 The 
 
substantially less information in absence of absolute secrecy); Alexander, supra note 5 (factual premise on which 
privilege is based, at least in the corporate context, i.e., that privilege is necessary to foster candid communications 
that lead to well-informed legal advice, is largely a matter of faith, supported by minimal empirical evidence, id.at 
194; most literature relating to the privilege in the corporate context has been limited to doctrinal analysis, id. at 194, 
concluding that the goals of the privilege can be achieved without applying the absolute privilege applicable in the 
case of an individual client, id. at 201, suggesting corporation’s privilege for lower-level communications should 
yield when a particularized showing of compelling need for the information outweighs corporation’s interest in 
confidentiality. Id. at 202). 
 
174 See Developments, supra note 1 at  1474-1476. 
 
175 See Developments, supra note 1 at  1479, n. 47 (citing E. GREEN& C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, 
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 522, 526 (1983)). 
 
176 Comment, supra note 5 at 1227, n.6 (survey actually conducted in November and December, 1961). 
 
177 Id. at  1227, n.6. 
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Yale Study data indicated 50.9% of laypersons believed they would be less likely to make full 
disclosure to a lawyer in the absence of privilege,178 but one third said they assumed a judge 
could order an attorney to reveal their statements.179 The authors concluded that most laypersons 
would continue to use their attorneys notwithstanding a belief that their confidential 
communications might be disclosed during litigation, at least under some circumstances:  
One justification for the attorney-client privilege is that in order to foster the 
socially authorized tasks attorneys perform, open and full client disclosure is 
desirable, and would sometimes be deterred without the privilege. This seems to 
assume a knowledge of the privileged communications rule which our study 
shows most people lack.180 
In the 1980s, Professor Zacharias surveyed 105 laypersons and 63 responding attorneys 
in Tompkins County, New York, an area which the author described the geographically based 
survey pool as “rural and university oriented.”181 The survey, generally referred to as “The 
Tompkins County Study,” found that about half the responders indicated they would withhold 
some information if there were no privilege protecting their communications,182 their responses 
indicated they would continue to consult with counsel if there were limited protections 
offered.183 Professor Zacharias concluded that the evidence from his study did not support the 
necessity of an absolute privilege.184 
178 Id. at  1236 n. 59. See also id. at 1235, n. 53. 
 
179 Id. at  1262. 
 
180 Id. at 1236. 
 
181 See Zacharias, supra note 5 at 379-380.  
 
182 Id. at 386. 
 
183 Id. at 394. 
 
184 Id. at 396. 
 
56
In a study of the corporate attorney client privilege conducted in the 1980s, Professor 
Alexander interviewed more than 182 randomly selected in-house-attorneys, outside counsel, 
and corporate executives, all practicing in New York City (the “Alexander Study”).185 Professor 
Alexander concluded,  that, despite the widely shared view among lawyers that the attorney-
client privilege encourages candor,186 responses indicated privilege is not always a key factor in 
determining candor in client communications.187 He noted that 46% of the clients he surveyed 
cited “trust and confidence” in the particular attorney as the most important factor influencing 
candor in their own attorney client communications.188 Curtailing the privilege, he concluded, 
would not stop corporate clients from communicating with counsel or affect the frequency of 
such communication.189 “The empirical findings show that an absolute privilege is simply not 
necessary to further the goals of the privilege in the corporate context.”190 “[B]reaking with the 
tradition of absolute privilege would have little or no effect on the candor of lower-level 
attorney-client communications, and would not deter, in most instances, the frequency of 
communication between attorneys and corporate employees.”191 
A 1995 survey of 12,500 members of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (the “NACDL Study”), with  365 outside counsel responding found that 95% of 
responding attorneys said “candor” and “compliance” were the two most important public 
 
185 Alexander, supra note 5 at 193, 202-206 (describing detail of survey methodology). 
 
186 Id. at 247-248. 
 
187 Id. at 263-267. 
 
188 Id.
189 Id. at 225, 263, 248-49. 
 
190 Id. at 384. 
 
191 Id. at 415.   
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interests served by the privilege; 96% responded that the privilege (and work-product doctrine) 
were important in facilitating their representation.192 
A 2005 survey of the corporate attorney client privilege conducted by the Association of 
Corporate Counsel (“ACC Study”) following the Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and market 
timing and late trading mutual fund prosecutions and litigations, found a very high correlation 
between the privilege and candor in communication among corporate counsel and clients.193 The 
ACC Study was of 719 in-house and outside counsel. The study found, for example, that 
responding lawyers believed that 93% of senior-level employees and 68% of lower-tier 
employees are aware of and rely on the attorney client privilege when consulting with them.194 It 
found that surveyed attorneys believe that absent privilege, clients would be less candid, with 
95% of the surveyed attorneys believing there would be a “chill” in the flow or candor of 
information from clients.195 The ACC determined that 96% of surveyed attorneys believed that 
work product and attorney client privilege facilitate the delivery of legal services.196 
The NACDL and ACC  are obviously politically sensitive attorney interest organizations.   
The prior studies, all based on random selections and/or geographically-based data sets, 
rather than interest group membership surveys, challenge the assumptions underlying the 
arguments for an absolute privilege, i.e., that substantially more (and substantially more candid) 
communication will occur between counsel and client, to the benefit of the justice system, if the 
 
192 See also Martz, supra note 5. 
 
193 See  Wander, supra note 5 at 196-197. 
 
194 Id. 
195 Id.
196 Id.
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implicit waiver doctrine is eliminated.197 The empirical data culled from non-interest-group 
member pools does not obviously support the critics’ central premise; therefore, their arguments 
do not provide a sound basis for rejecting Hearn.198 
Some commentators, however, have argued that empirical results should be irrelevant to 
determination of privilege issues: 
From my perspective, the critical issue in assessing the attorney-client privilege 
and the obligation of confidentiality is not at all empirical.  It is whether a client 
should be entitled to ‘rely on his attorney without question or doubt’. . . and 
whether he should ‘know as well as he is likely ever to know the future that 
giving the truth to his attorney will not hurt him.’ . . . Forsaking more 
consequential justifications for the attorney-client privilege and the duty of 
confidentiality, I would favor these venerable legal and ethical institutions even if 
it could be demonstrated that most clients would tell their lawyers the truth 
without them.199 
C. Privilege, Waiver and the Search for Truth 
Critics of the implied waiver doctrine urge that if our adversarial system is to function 
effectively, its rules must assure attorneys can provide their clients with the best possible 
representation; this requires rules that assure attorneys will obtain optimal (and optimally candid) 
 
197 See Zacharias, supra note 5 at  384-385 (although clients generally accepted that lawyers have a higher 
legal obligation to preserve confidences than accountants and social workers, only half of the clients surveyed were 
more likely to give information to attorneys and few were prepared to trust lawyers over priests, doctors, 
psychologists, or psychiatrists, calling into question “the central role the legal profession attributes to strict rules in 
encouraging potential clients to use lawyers and confide in them. Evidently, guaranteeing confidentiality by rule or 
statute is no substitute for providing quality assistance in needed services.”). Id. at 386 (survey answers suggest 
strict confidentiality rules not essential to maintaining an adversary system  -- clients never told of confidentiality 
“may be as ready to provide information as clients who were informed.”). 
 
198 See Zacharias, supra note 5 at  358 (utilitarian rationale of attorney-client confidentiality rests on a three-
step syllogism. first, for the adversary system to function, citizens need lawyers to resolve their disputes and lawyers 
need to be able to represent their clients effectively; second, attorneys can be effective only if they are provided with 
all of the relevant facts; third, clients may not employ attorneys, or at least not provide them with adequate 
information, unless they are assured that the relationship will remain confidential – empirically challenging 
syllogism premises); Alexander, supra note 5, at 217-218 (discussing non-instrumental privacy rationale and candor 
arguments, empirically challenging syllogism premises); Imwinkelried, supra note 12 at 153-154 (arguing empirical 
studies do not support the assumption that consulting and confiding behavior requires that privilege be absolute. Id.
at 157-159 (discussing results of Yale, Zacharias and Alexander empirical studies)). 
 
199 Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge 
Frankel, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 67, 73-74 (1982). 
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communication about relevant events, from their clients.  Supporters of implied waiver have 
tended to focus on a different issue, namely, our legal system’s primary objective.  They 
maintain our legal system’s goal is to provide a context in which all litigants are assured they 
will be able to argue positions, with access to all vital information, including, in some cases, 
once privileged information, at least under some conditions.   
The attitude one expresses toward the implied waiver doctrine, and privileges, generally, 
will reflect one’s views about the type of legal system one believes would best serve society, 
including one’s fears about abuses that might result from adoption of a particular rule or 
interpretation.  Criminal defense attorneys, as reflected in the NACDL study,  may, for example, 
fear overly-zealous prosecutors will unfairly pry into client confidences, compromising privacy 
rights and constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination, undermining counsel’s ability to 
effectively represent clients, so that zealots can bring to bear the full weight of the government, 
unfairly, on the individual defendant.  Commentators, however, have challenged the extent to 
which this conception of legal representation actually represents the practice of law: 
As for the romance, in contexts like this our image tends to be of the heroic, 
selfless lawyer standing between a hostile world and helpless, dependent client. 
This approximates only the occasional situation in the real world. Far more often 
the beneficiaries of the privilege are corporate clients and the rich – people who 
can afford lawyers to confide in. This is not say that disclosure of the truth is 
process for scourging the rich. It is to say that our gropings toward sound policy 
are difficult enough without strewing fantasies along the way to distort our 
vision.200 
Critics of the implied waiver doctrine may, much like its supporters, believe one salutary 
end of our legal system is the discovery of the truth about the material events underlying a 
litigation or prosecution.  What they may not believe is that the discovery of truth, in individual 
 
200 Judge Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued, More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 51, 
62  (1982). 
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cases, is more important than preventing the potential abuse of citizens, by a very powerful 
government. Because the attorney client privilege is unquestionably part of a just society’s 
armament against the possibility of government oppression of individual liberties, recognition of 
the possibility of implied waiver is, for them, one step down a very slippery slope. 
As with most deeply-felt debates about fundamental issues, there is some “truth” on both 
sides.  Worries about governmental over-reaching are legitimate concerns and should be a 
concern to every citizen with a sense of political history.  One commentator recently summarized 
why the debate about the role of privileges has been intractable: 
The rules of privilege . . . bar courts and judges from considering admittedly 
probative, and potentially crucial, evidence in order to pursue extrinsic policies 
not directly related to accurate fact-finding. . . This must be astounding to the 
uninitiated -- what could possibly be more important than the accurate 
determination of facts, surely a condition of the right to a fair trial? Yet rules of 
privilege exist. Inherent in their existence is a moral-political determination that 
the relevant extrinsic value is more important than a fair trial, and an instrumental 
assumption that the exclusion of evidence would be effective in preserving that 
extrinsic value. Here, our problems begin. Is there any principled way to compare 
the value of a fair trial with an extrinsic value . . .Difficult moral and 
philosophical questions have to be answered. Is there any satisfactory way of 
finding out if, and to what extent, the assurance of evidential privilege is effective 
in encouraging, for example, a client to be more forthcoming with his or her 
lawyer? Complex psychological phenomena must be explored. The astute reader 
will already see that any answer to the first (moral-political) question will be 
arbitrary, and that any answer to the second (instrumental question) will be highly 
speculative. The shape of our rules of privilege exemplify this, and consequently 
suffer from a lack of logical coherence. It would have been far easier if all the 
rules of privilege were abolished . . . the moral determination being that nothing is 
worth jeopardizing a fair trial. This has not been the position for any of the major 
common law jurisdictions. . . . The line-drawing exercise here is fraught with 
illogical compromises more commonly seen in political, rather than judicial, 
decision-making. 201 
The “extrinsic value” to which the above commentator refers is the benefit privileges 
bring about within the system, via increased candor in client communications with counsel, 
 
201 Michael Hor, Evidential Privilege: Sacrifice in the Search for Truth, Sing. J. Legal Studies 410, 410-411 
(Dec. 2001)(discussing the law of Singapore and how implied waiver is treated in other countries).   
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namely “better representation.”202 Empirical studies, of course, have their limitations.203 Even if 
an absolute interpretation of privilege resulted in increased client/counsel communication, contra 
the studies, and even if increased communication resulted in “better representation,” such “better 
representation” would not necessarily result in a “better” system of justice.   
Implied waiver critics seem to assume an absolute interpretation of the attorney client 
privilege  results in a “better system.” The theory seems to be that where counsel receives 
optimal information, he or she will be better able to devise and implement strategies to forward 
client interests.  Because an absolute privilege will, under this theory, provide counsel with more 
and more candid information, it fosters “better representation,” in the sense of increasing the 
attorney’s ability to succeed in obtaining client goals.   
A just legal system, however, is not necessarily one whose rules permits counsel the best 
chance of prevailing, regardless of the truth, and the concept of “best representation” within a 
legal system, is not equivalent to representation which happens to create for the client the best 
chance of “winning.”  The point is easily illustrated. Assume a large percentage of corporations 
are engaging in illegal conduct, with substantial, negative effects on the American economy and 
that an absolute interpretation of the attorney client privilege would facilitate company avoidance 
 
202 Commentators, have noted England, Australia, Canada and Ireland have shifted from absolute to qualified 
privileges without injury to the health of their professions -- the experience of these countries, they argue, supports 
most of the empirical studies on privileges, discussed above. See Imwinkelried, supra note 12 at 174-180 (“The 
available empirical data undercuts the assumption that the average layperson is as obsessed by a fear of subsequent 
judicially compelled disclosure as Wigmore supposed.  If that assumption is false, the recognition of privileges does 
not come cost free.  Quite to the contrary, it comes at the price of miscarriages of justice; in many, if not most cases, 
the wooden application of an absolute privilege will suppress probative evidence that would have come into 
existence even absent the privilege.”). 
 
203 The studies generally recognize their own limitations.  See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 5 at 377 (although 
the question whether the beneficial effects of strict confidentiality are outweighed by countervailing negative effects 
is normative, it is  important to try to reconcile the theory of confidentiality with reality, concluding the studies 
discussed suggest justifications commonly offered for strict confidentiality are open to question, but urging the need 
for additional empirical studies).  
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of criminal penalties and civil damages in class suits, to the detriment of an enormous number of 
Americans.204 It is likely an absolute interpretation of the attorney client privilege would 
facilitate “better representation,” at least in terms of accomplishing client litigation objectives.  
However, it would effectively undermine the legal system’s ability to protect injured 
parties by assuring information vital to determining the truth about relevant events would be 
hidden.  An “absolute” interpretation of the attorney client privilege plainly imposes such costs 
on the legal system and, indeed, effects how society perceives the ability of the legal system to 
reach just ends: 
Strict rules help engrain the hired gun mentality in the professional ethos. In 
practice, lawyers and laymen alike come to view the profession as amoral 'tools' 
of the client, meriting the right to earn a living, but little else.  . . To the extent 
strict rules cause lawyers to engage in 'moral escapism' . . . confidentiality also 
helps foster the public notion that lawyers lack integrity. . . The image of the 
coconspiratorial lawyer helps explain why society considers the profession 
unsavory. . . Clients and observers of the legal profession naturally come to look 
upon lawyers as 'dissemblers, distorters who subordinate truth to winning, and as 
technicians who answer to but one command, that of their client.' 205 
To similar effect, another commentator writes: 
Lawyers themselves are recognizing that the public perception that lawyers twist 
words to meet their own goals and pay little attention to the truth, strikes at the 
very heart of the profession – as well as at the heart of the system of justice. 
 
204 This thesis is consistent with the radically different in outcomes in the empirical studies of corporate 
privilege conducted by Professor Alexander and ACC, discussed above.   
 
205 Zacharias, supra note 5 at 375 (notes omitted).  See also Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 
Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1142 (1988) (arguments in favor of [absolute] confidentiality reflect perverse priorities showing 
“greater solicitude for the withholding client than for the opposing party who will be harmed by nondisclosure”). 
But see Salkin and Phillips, supra note 11 at 609-610 (quoting comments of American Bar Association President 
Michael Greco in a speech to the American Council of Trial Lawyers in defense of the attorney-client privilege on 
April 8, 2006, as follows: “Threats to the privilege. . . represent just one front in a growing governmental assault on 
the independence of the legal profession itself, and on the ability of lawyers effectively to counsel clients.  A wide 
range of government policies and practices are now combining – either coincidentally or by design – to attempt to 
marginalize and diminish the lawyer’s role in society as trusted advisor, counselor, and defender of rights. . . Erosion 
of the lawyer-client relationship will lead to the diminishment of the lawyer’s role in society because clients will no 
longer entrust confidences with and seek counsel from their lawyers.  And such diminishment will lead to a less 
effective, less respected, and greatly reduced lawyer’s role in society not only in particular client matters, but more 
broadly.” The Greco address is available at http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/triallawyersaddress.shtml. 
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Lawyers serve our system of justice, and if lawyers are dishonest, then there is a 
perception that the system, too, must be dishonest.206  
Although it is impossible to assess what affect what broad societal perception of this view 
might have on individual conduct, it is reasonable to believe the cost is substantial.     
Defense counsel advocates of absolute privilege make two fundamental errors.  First, 
they mistake what they are trying to doing, within the system, which is often obscuring the truth, 
with what the system is trying to do, i.e., trying to find out what actually occurred.  Second, 
where counsel knows a represented party violated the law, he or she may perceive representation 
is “better” if a rule increases the opportunity for a defense outcome, regardless of what clients 
have done.  This is error because a legal system which cannot bring truth to light not only 
permits an injustice in one case, but encourages those inclined to wrongdoing to engage in 
continuing, wrongful conduct, to the detriment of future victims and legal system, itself.    
CONCLUSION 
Adjudications are “just” when litigation outcomes reflect accurate assessments of what 
actually occurred; however, just results must be reached by fair and reasonable procedures.  Fair 
and reasonable procedures show respect for the confidentiality of communications between 
counsel and client and should be designed to make abuse difficult.  The elements of the Hearn 
Test show a fair and reasonable respect for the confidentiality of communications and its 
component elements are plainly intended to avoid abuse, as the Section II and III cases show.  
Unfair outcomes are a very high price to pay for a system which cherishes truth and demands fair 
adjudicative procedures to protect litigants’ rights.  The injustices that, all sides agree, would 
 
206 Hodes, supra note 1 at 74.  But see Developments, supra note 1 at  1474-1477 (“Although critics may 
justifiably claim that proponents of privileges fail to establish their assumptions empirically, the critics themselves 
fail to realize that the costs that privileges purportedly impose on the correct disposal of litigation are just as 
empirically uncertain as their asserted benefits. . . the magnitude of the cost a privilege imposes on truth-seeking 
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inevitably result from elimination of implied waiver from our legal system provide a powerful 
rationale for continued application of the Hearn Test.   
822421 
depends on exactly the same empirically unverified factor that determines the benefit gained by a privilege: namely, 
the extent to which people would communicate in the absence of the privilege.” (note omitted) (emphasis added)). 
